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I. Introduction
On May 30, 2012, forty-seven residents of the Sucumbios
province of Ecuador (Plaintiffs) filed a statement of claim against
the Chevron Corporation, Chevron Canada Limited, and Chevron
Canada Finance Limited in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice'
seeking recognition and enforcement of an $18.25 billion
judgment entered against Chevron by the Provincial Court of
Justice of Nueva Loja in the Sucumbios Province of Ecuador on
February 14, 2011, and affirmed by the Appellate Division of that
same Provincial Court on January 3, 2012.2 The recognition of the
Judgment outside of Ecuador is crucial, as Chevron maintains
insufficient assets in Ecuador for complete satisfaction of
Plaintiffs' award.3 The Statement of Claim filed in Canada is the
first effort seeking such recognition.4 Although Canada is neither
Chevron's domicile nor the location of its most significant assets,
Plaintiffs' selection of Canada is nevertheless logical, as Canada is
"one of the most hospitable jurisdictions in the world for the
recognition and enforcement of judgments from foreign
jurisdictions."'
I Statement of Claim, Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corp., 2012 No. 12-454778 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter Statement of Claim]. All references to "Chevron" throughout
this article will be to Chevron Corporation unless otherwise stated.
2 Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 2011-0106 (Sucumbios Provincial Ct. of
Justice of Nueva Loja, App. Div., Jan. 3, 2012) (Ecuador). See also Aguinda
v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 002-2003 (Sucumbios Provincial Ct. of Justice of Nueva
Loja, Feb. 14, 2011) (Ecuador).
3 Chevron has approximately $200 million in assets in or originating from
Ecuador including a $96.3 million debt owed to it by the Ecuadorian government, funds
located in various bank accounts, and licensing fees generated by the use of Chevron
trademarks in the country. See Court Orders First Handover of Chevron's Ecuador
Assets, ENVTL. NEWS SERv. (Oct. 17, 2012), http://ens-newswire.comI/2012/10/17/court-
orders-first-handover-of-chevrons-ecuador-assets/.
4 See Case Profile: Texaco/Chevron Lawsuits (Re Ecuador), BUS. AND HUMAN
RIGHTS RES. CTR. (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:24 PM), http://www.business-humanrights.org/
Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/LawsuitsSelectedcases/TexacoChevro
nlawsuitsreEcuador.
5 H. Scott Fairley, International Issues in National Courts: Recent Developments
in Private Litigation: Open Season: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Canada After Beals v. Saldanha, 11 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305, 316 (2005). See
also infra note 157 and accompanying text. This hospitality is consistent with Plaintiffs'
strategy of seeking enforcement in "jurisdictions that offer the path of least resistance to
enforcement" and have "the most favorable law and practical circumstances." PATTON
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This article examines the status of the Ecuadorian Judgment
(Judgment). The article initially explores the history of Texaco's
investment in Ecuador, the environmental impacts allegedly
resulting from Texaco's activities in Ecuador, and the history of
resulting litigation in the United States and Ecuador. Section III of
the article reviews Plaintiffs' recognition proceeding in Canada as
well as subsequent related litigation in the United States and
before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Section IV examines
Canadian law relating to the recognition of foreign judgments,
including the Supreme Court of Canada's opinion in Beals v.
Saldanha,' the public policy defense annunciated in that opinion,
and its elaboration in subsequent provincial opinions. Section V
analyzes Plaintiffs' recognition action in Canada within the
context of the public policy defense. The article concludes that
Chevron may be able to assert a public policy-based defense
despite substantial burdens and risks. The recognition action also
presents significant issues affecting the reputation and credibility
of the Canadian judiciary in general, as well as the liberal
approach taken with respect to foreign judgments.
II. Texaco's Investment in Ecuador and Resultant Litigation
A. Texaco's Investment in Petroleum Exploration and
Production
In March 1964, the Ecuadorian government invited Texaco
and Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf) to conduct exploratory activities
in the Oriente region.' Texaco and Gulf accepted this invitation
and formed a consortium (Consortium) to conduct this
exploration.! The Consortium discovered commercial quantities
BoGGS LLP, PATH FORWARD: SECURING AND ENFORCING JUDGMENT AND REACHING
SETTLEMENT 12, 18 (undated) (detailing Plaintiffs' potential worldwide enforcement
strategy).
6 Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416 (Can.).
7 Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility 3.5, Chevron Corp. v.
Republic of Ecuador, Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012) [hereinafter Third Interim
Award].
8 The Consortium agreement was between Compania Texaco de Petroleos del
Ecuador, a subsidiary of Texaco del Ecuador, and Gulf Ecuatoriana de Petroleo, a
subsidiary of Gulf Ecuador. See Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 658 F. Supp.
1061, 1065 (D. Del. 1987).
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of oil in 1967 and began export operations in 1972.9 Texaco
served as the Consortium's operator throughout this period of
time. o
Effective June 1972, Ecuadorian law limited the size of
concession areas granted to foreign oil companies, increased the
royalties payable to the government, and established that "[t]he
deposits of hydrocarbons and accompanying substances, in
whatever physical state, located in the national territory ... belong
to the inalienable. . . patrimony of the State."" Texaco and Gulf
relinquished a portion of their concession area to the state-owned
oil company, Compania Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana (CEPE).12
New concession agreements granting CEPE a 25% interest in the
Consortium were executed in August 1973 and June 1974."
Texaco continued its participation in the Consortium as the
operator and owner until July 1990 when Petroamazonas, a
subsidiary of PetroEcuador, assumed control of operations.14
Texaco's role as a participant in the Consortium ended in June
1992 when the concession agreement expired and was not
renewed. 5 The Consortium extracted more than 1.4 billion barrels
of oil from the commencement of commercial production in 1972
9 Judith Kimerling, Indigenous People and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The
Case ofEcuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
413,414-15 (2006) (setting forth a comprehensive history of the Consortium).
10 Complaint at 5, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 002-2003 (Sucumbios
Provincial Ct. of Justice of Nueva Loja, May 7, 2003) (Ecuador) [hereinafter Lago
Agrio Complaint] (alleging Texaco was responsible for "the design, construction,
installation and operation of the infrastructure and necessary equipment for the
exploration and exploitation of the crude oil"). Texaco's role as operator of the
Consortium was not, however, absolute. See Third Interim Award, supra note 7, 3.8,
3.9 (concluding that the Ecuadorian national government "regulated, approved[,] and, in
many instances, mandated the Consortium's activities; and no facilities were constructed,
nor wells drilled, nor oil extracted without the Government's oversight and approval").
11 See Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (D.
Del. 1987), (quoting the Law of Hydrocarbons, arts. 40B (1971) (Ecuador)). See also
Supreme Decree No. 430 (June 6, 1972) (Ecuador) (implementing the Hydrocarbons
Law effective June 1972).
12 CEPE is the predecessor in interest of PetroEcuador. See Republic of Ecuador
v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
13 See id. at 340; see also Third Interim Award, supra note 7, 1 3.6. Gulf sold its
remaining interest to CEPE in December 1976 for $82.1 million. Id.
14 See Third Interim Award, supra note 7, 1 3.10.
15 See id. $ 3.11.
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through the expiration of the concession agreement in 1992.16 The
Ecuadorian government received approximately $23 billion in
revenues, royalties, taxes, and subsidies during this period of time,
and Texaco received approximately $500 million as a result of the
Consortium's operations."
The Consortium's environmental and health impacts are
subject to considerable controversy." In 1990, PetroEcuador and
Texaco retained two consulting firms to conduct environmental
audits of the Consortium's facilities.19 These audits indicated that
the cost of environmental remediation for the Consortium's
facilities was approximately $8 million to $13 million.2 0 in May
1995, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Energy and Mines,
PetroEcuador, and Texaco entered into an agreement wherein
Texaco agreed to remediate designated sites at its sole expense in
return for a release from existing and future claims by Ecuador
and PetroEcuador.2 1 Texaco drafted plans for each site, obtained
Ecuador and PetroEcuador's approval, and performed the
remediation from October 1995 through September 1998 at a cost
of $40 million.2 2 The Ecuadorian government and PetroEcuador
signed the "Act of Final Liberation of Claims and Equipment
Delivery" on September 30, 1998, in which they certified that
Texaco had fulfilled the 1995 agreement and released it from
16 Complaint at 22, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4718 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994).
17 Id
18 See, e.g., Lago Agrio Complaint, supra note 10, at 11-14 (alleging
contamination of land and water resources through discharge of more than 464.7 million
barrels of formation waters, increased rates of cancer and other diseases among Oriente
residents, and crop and livestock losses). But see Doug Cassel, Defrauding Chevron in
Ecuador: Doug Cassel's Reply to the Plaintiffs' Legal Team, 11-12 (Apr. 10, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) (summarizing findings by Chevron's
epidemiological and environmental experts that mortality and disease rates in the Oriente
were similar to those in areas not subject to long-term oil extraction activities and there
was little or no environmental impact or public health concerns resulting from the
Consortium's operations).
19 See Third Interim Award, supra note 7,13.10.
20 See id.
21 Id. 3.16-3.17.
22 Id. 3.20-3.22, 3.24. Remediation costs included $1 million for socio-
economic projects and $3.7 million to the municipalities of Lago Agrio, Shushufindi,
Joya de los Sachas, and Francisco de Orellana in return for their dismissal of lawsuits
and agreement to release Texaco from future liability. Id. $ 3.22.
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current and future liability.2 3
B. Environmental Litigation in the United States
Seventy-four Ecuadorians purporting to represent more than
30,000 Oriente residents injured as a result of environmental
contamination filed a class action lawsuit against Texaco in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
in November 1993.24 The district court dismissed the complaint
on the basis of forum non conveniens in 2001.25 The district court
also concluded that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs had failed to
establish "a meaningful nexus" between the United States and the
Consortium's decisions and practices in Ecuador, such as "control
or direction over the pipe design, waste disposal, and other
allegedly negligent practices." 26 The sole connections the United
States had to the Consortium's decisions and practices were the
exercise of general oversight regarding finances, advice on
operational decisions previously made in Ecuador, and the
provision of technical information on remediation of oil spills.27
Consequently, there was insufficient evidence establishing the
parent corporation exercised the necessary direction and control of
Texaco's subsidiaries required to impose liability.2 8 In 2002, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
this dismissal, contingent upon Texaco's agreement to be sued in
Ecuador, accept service of process, and waive any statute of
limitations defense for claims expiring between the date of the
filing of the complaint in the United States and one year following
the complaint's dismissal.2 9
23 Id. 3.26.
24 See Complaint, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93-7527, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4718 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994).
25 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
26 Id. at 539, 549-50.
27 Id. at 549-50.
28 The district court concluded that "Texaco's only meaningful involvement in the
activities here complained of was its indirect investment in its fourth-tier subsidiary ...
which is not a party here and which conducted its participation in the activities here
complained of almost exclusively in Ecuador." Id. at 548.
29 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 478-80 (2d Cir. 2002).
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C. Environmental Litigation in Ecuador: Procedural Issues
and the Trial
Plaintiffs commenced litigation in Ecuador in May 2003.0
Plaintiffs based their lawsuit upon provisions of the Ecuadorian
Constitution 3 ' and the Environmental Management Law of 1999.32
Plaintiffs sought remediation of environmental contamination in
the concession area and damages in an unspecified amount, 10%
of which was to be remitted to Frente de Defensa de la Amazonia
(Frente).
Chevron's primary defenses were summarized in its Petition to
Dismiss filed in October 2003.34 These defenses included a claim
that Plaintiffs sued the wrong entity by failing to assert claims
against Texaco, 35 lack of personal jurisdiction, expiration of the
30 See Third Interim Award, supra note 7, 3.34.
31 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, August 11, 1998, arts. 23, 86-88,
90-91 (guaranteeing Ecuadorians the right to live in a healthy environment, stating the
public's interest in environmental protection and biodiversity, and requiring government
regulation of all aspects of the manufacture and distribution of substances injurious to
human health and the environment). All references to the Ecuadorian Constitution
contained herein shall be to the 1998 version, which was in force and effect at the time of
the filing of the Lago Agrio Complaint.
32 Ley de Gesti6n Ambiental [Environmental Management Law], Law No. 99-37,
arts. 41, 43 (Ecuador) (recognizing a "popular action to denounce the breaching of
environmental laws . .. and [obtain] damages ... for the deterioration of. .. health [and]
damage to the environment").
33 Lago Agrio Complaint, supra note 10, at 22-25.
34 Petition to Dismiss for Chevron Corp. at 10-18, Aguinda
v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 002-2003 (Sucumbios Provincial Ct. of Justice of Nueva
Loja, Oct. 8, 2007) (Ecuador) [hereinafter Chevron Petition to Dismiss].
35 Id. at 18-19. Chevron contended that it did not acquire Texaco in 2001. Rather,
Texaco was merged with a wholly-owned subsidiary of Chevron called Keepep, Inc.
with Texaco as the surviving corporation. Id. at 19 n.14. All of Texaco's pre-merger
shares were cancelled and those of Keepep were converted into new shares of Texaco,
resulting in Chevron's complete ownership of the surviving entity. Id. Texaco
maintained separate legal status and assumed responsibility for Plaintiffs' alleged
injuries. Id. The structure of this type of merger has led at least one U.S. court to
conclude that "[a]s a matter of U.S. law, the assertion that Chevron succeeded to
Texaco's liabilities by merger is incorrect." Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d
581, 600 n.40 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) vacated sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, Nos. 11-
1150-cv(L), 11-1264-cv(con), 11-2259-op(con), 2011 WL 4375022 (2nd Cir. 2011),
rev'd on other grounds, Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo 667 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 2012); see
also William J. Rands, Corporate Tax: The Agony and the Ecstasy, 83 NEB. L. REv. 39,
51 n.76 (2004) (stating that "the reverse triangular merger prevents inchoate liabilities
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statute of limitations, and lack of standing.3 6
The Provincial Court deferred ruling on these defenses and
commenced proceedings in October 2003.3' The court initially
accepted a joint plan for the collection of evidence consisting of
judicial inspections of designated sites followed by expert
determinations of the causes of any discovered contamination and
the cost of remediation.38 One hundred and twelve sites were to be
inspected pursuant to negotiated sampling and analysis plans.39
However, implementation of the joint plan was plagued by
controversies concerning methodology4 0 and the credibility of one
of Plaintiffs' experts' reports.4 1 The plan was abandoned in July
from flowing into an acquiring corporation [as] the target is kept alive [and] is
responsible for its own liabilities").
36 The consent to personal jurisdiction in Ecuador and waiver of the four-year
statute of limitations were binding only on Texaco as the sole party to the U.S. litigation
and in the absence of a successor-in-interest relationship between Chevron and Texaco.
See Chevron Petition to Dismiss, supra note 34, at 19-20; see also CoDIGO CIVIL [C. CiV.]
art. 2235 (Ecuador) (setting forth the applicable statute of limitations). The standing
defense was based upon the Environmental Management Law, which requires plaintiffs
to demonstrate individualized harm rather than communal harm. See LEY DE GESTION
AMBIENTAL [Environmental Management Law], Law No. 99-37, arts. 41, 43 (Ecuador)
(providing that persons "affected directly by the harmful act or omission, may file ...
actions for damages and losses and for deterioration caused to health or to the
environment").
37 See Third Interim Award, supra note 7, f 3.37-38.
38 Chevron Petition to Dismiss, supra note 34, at 22.
39 Id. at 23-24. Forty-seven of the 122 designated sites were ultimately inspected.
Id. at 24.
40 Id. at 28-30 (alleging Plaintiffs' experts failed to report data on more than half
of their soil and water samples, refused to utilize accredited laboratories for analysis,
attributed all contamination to the Consortium's activities, and collected samples in areas
that were PetroEcuador's responsibility to remediate). Chevron moved to expunge this
evidence from the record, but the Provincial Court failed to conduct a hearing as required
by Ecuador's Civil Code. See CODIGO CIVIL [C. cIv.] arts. 256, 258 (Ecuador) (requiring
courts to conduct hearings and expunge erroneous expert reports in the event an expert is
deemed to have committed material errors).
41 The report at issue was prepared by Dr. Charles Calmbacher. According to
Chevron, Calmbacher's finding of environmental damage at two sites was tainted by
prior discussion of his proposed findings with Plaintiffs' counsel, who allegedly
instructed him with respect to the outcome of his study. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger,
768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 605-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that one of Plaintiffs'
representatives told Calmbacher that he "wanted the answer to be that there was
contamination and people were injured . .. [bjecause it makes money. That's what wins
his case"). Chevron also claimed that Calmbacher's report was authored by Plaintiffs'
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2006 when the court appointed a single expert to conduct
inspections and prepare a report.4 2
The court appointed Richard Cabrera to determine the
existence and source of environmental contamination and specify
the nature of the work to be completed to remediate such
locations.43 Cabrera concluded 80% of the waste pits and 100% of
the production station pits needed to be remediated.4 Chevron
objected to Cabrera's methodology, 45  accused him of
litigation team and submitted to the Provincial Court without his approval, as evidenced
by his subsequent disavowal of its contents. Id. at 606 (finding evidence that "persons
acting on behalf of [Plaintiffs] prepared reports expressing views contrary to
Calmbacher's and submitted those fictitious reports to the ... court over his name").
42 Chevron objected to this order as inconsistent with the previously agreed
procedures and contended that the order was the product of pressure placed upon the
court by then-presidential candidate Rafael Correa. See Chevron Petition to Dismiss,
supra note 34, at 37-38; see also Claimants' Notice of Arbitration at 11, Chevron Corp.
v. Republic of Ecuador, Case No. 2009-23 (Permanent Ct. Arb. 2012) [hereinafter
Chevron Notice of Arbitration].
43 Chevron Petition to Dismiss, supra note 34, at 37. Chevron claimed Cabrera
was an improper choice due to his lack of experience in hydrocarbon chemistry,
epidemiology, hydrogeology, remediation technologies, and oil and gas operations. Id.
at 38. It was subsequently alleged that Plaintiffs had advance knowledge of Cabrera's
appointment and paid him prior to the commencement of his work. Chevron Corp., 768
F. Supp. 2d at 607. The evidence marshaled by Chevron to date led one U.S. court to
concede the possibility that "Cabrera, the supposedly independent court appointee, was
paid money up front and promised future consideration by the [Plaintiffs] in the event
they prevailed." Id. The district court further concluded there was "substantial evidence
of irregularity relating to the appointment and independence of Cabrera." Id. at 606; see
also Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (opinion on
partial summary judgment motion) (describing ex parte communications between
Plaintiffs' representatives and the Provincial Court regarding Cabrera's appointment in
2006 and 2007); Witness Statement of Douglas Beltman 15, Chevron Corp. v.
Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter Beltman Statement] (in
which Stratus Consulting, Inc.'s former executive vice-president stated "Cabrera lacked
the skill, qualifications, and experience to conduct or review a multi-disciplinary
environmental damages assessment himself"). For a description of Stratus' involvement
in the Ecuadorian litigation, see infra note 58 and accompanying text.
44 Press Release, Chevron Corporation, Ecuador Lawsuit Report Has Fabricated
Evidence, Tainted by Political Pressure 2 (Sept. 15, 2008) (on file with author). Chevron
alleged Cabrera's conclusions were based upon his visits to forty-eight well sites and one
production station and his review of aerial photographs. Id
45 See Chevron Corporation's Rebuttal Brief at 4, I1, Aguinda
v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 002-2003 (Sucumbios Provincial Ct. of Justice of Nueva
Loja, Sept. 15, 2008) (Ecuador) [hereinafter Chevron Rebuttal Briefj (expressing
"grave concerns" regarding Cabrera's methodology); see also Chevron Petition to
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misconduct,4 6 and contended that utilization of his report would
violate Ecuador's Constitution.
In April 2008, Cabrera assessed Plaintiffs' damages at $16.3
billion.48  This assessment included compensation for claims of
wrongful death and environmental remediation, amounts sufficient
to construct health care facilities and infrastructure for
PetroEcuador, and disgorgement of Texaco's profits earned from
its participation in the Consortium.4 9 Cabrera revised this estimate
to $27.3 billion in November 2008 to include multi-billion dollar
awards for cancer deaths, groundwater and soil remediation,
additional infrastructure construction, and an unjust enrichment
penalty."o This damages calculation exceeded Chevron's 2008 net
earnings and was almost twice the amount of its net earnings
derived from international operations."1
Chevron contended the estimates relating to cancer deaths and
unjust enrichment exceeded the scope of Cabrera's mandate,5 2
Dismiss, supra note 34, at 40, 43 (accusing Cabrera of improperly limiting his sample
size, extrapolating individual results over the entire concession area, and failing to
maintain chain of custody for samples).
46 See Chevron Rebuttal Brief, supra note 45, at 4, 6, 8, 11-14 (accusing Cabrera
of altering evidence, employing unqualified personnel for sampling and testing, barring
Chevron representatives from locations during sampling, and collaborating with
Plaintiffs' attorneys in the preparation of his report); see also Chevron Petition to
Dismiss, supra note 34, at 42-44 (accusing Cabrera of discarding clean soil samples,
destroying exculpatory evidence, and describing his inspection process as "rank
amateurism" and "irredeemable bias" which could not serve as a "legitimate expert
determination of the environmental impact [of hydrocarbon operations in the Oriente] or
its source"); Beltman Statement, supra note 43, 10 (claiming that he was instructed that
all aspects of work related to damages assessment "remain absolutely secret").
47 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, August 11, 1998, arts. 13, 22, 24,
192 (providing, in part, for equal rights for foreigners and Ecuadorians, state liability for
the "inadequate administration of justice," and due process, including equal access to the
judiciary and "effective, impartial and expedited protection of... rights and interests").
48 CHEVRON, CHEVRON CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT 47 (2008), available at
http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/annualreport/chevron2008annualreport-full.pdf
49 Id.
50 FRENTE DE DEFENSA DE LA AMAZONIA, $27 BILLION DAMAGES ASSESSMENT, 1-2,
available at http://www.chevron.toxico.com/about/historic-trial/27-billion-damages-
assessment/.
51 Chevron had net earnings of $23.9 billion in 2008, of which $14.5 billion were
derived from its international operations. CHEVRON CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 49, at 34.
52 See Chevron Rebuttal Brief, supra note 45, at 6, 17 (claiming Cabrera
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noting that the estimate for cancer deaths also did not identify the
alleged victims, types of cancer, or supporting documentation.5 3
The unjust enrichment penalty was not provided for by Ecuadorian
law, was grossly excessive in comparison to Texaco's Consortium
profits, and was not requested in the Complaint.5 4 Chevron also
contended that the damages estimates within the scope of
Cabrera's mandate were inflated." Cabrera's conclusions placed
responsibility for all environmental impacts upon Texaco and
failed to attribute any responsibility to PetroEcuador.5 6 Chevron
improperly "assessed billions of dollars to compensate for alleged personal injuries, to
improve public services, to foster indigenous cultures, to modernize PetroEcuador's
equipment, and to take away alleged 'unfair profits"' and ascribing responsibility for
Ecuador's "endemic social problems" to Texaco).
53 Id. at 17. Douglas Beltman described the damages estimate relating to
purported cancer deaths as follows:
Stratus never determined that any individual actually got cancer as a result of oil
production. The Cabrera Report cannot be relied upon to conclude that any
individual has actually gotten cancer as a result of living near oil operations in
the Oriente, that there was any elevated risk of cancer from living near oil
operations in the Oriente, or that there is any reliable or valid basis for the
damages assessed to Chevron.
Beltman Statement, supra note 43, 53. See also infra notes 94-98 and accompanying
text (discussing findings regarding similar claims in related litigation occurring in the
United States).
54 See CHEVRON CORP., REBUTTAL TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT REPORT 7
(2009); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text; Beltman Statement, supra note
43, 154 ("I have no basis to believe .. [unjust enrichment] is a valid claim.").
55 Chevron accused Cabrera of including more than $1 billion in soil remediation
costs for locations that he did not visit and waste pits that did not exist. See Chevron
Notice of Arbitration, supra note 42, at 11. Cabrera also assessed the cost of remediation
of waste pits at $2.2 million per pit despite similar remediation by PetroEcuador at a cost
of $85,000 per pit. See CHEVRON CORP., TEXACO PETROLEUM, ECUADOR AND THE
LAWSUIT AGAINST CHEVRON 10 (2009). Chevron alleged Cabrera's estimates relating to
the improvement of Ecuador's potable water system were tainted by his failure to take a
single drinking water sample. Id. See also Beltman Statement, supra note 43, T 48-50,
52, 56 (discounting damages assessments for soil, groundwater, and natural resources
remediation and the construction of a potable water system and infrastructure
improvements as unsupported by "scientific data" and "not accurate, reliable, or valid").
Beltman concluded that he "[could not] say who may have any responsibility for any
environmental contamination in the Oriente, what the extent of such contamination may
be or what the appropriate damages amounts may be to remediate any such
contamination." Id. 64.
56 See Chevron Notice of Arbitration, supra note 42, at 11; see also Beltman
Statement, supra note 43, TT 33-34 (stating Stratus was instructed that "it was not
necessary to allocate any of the responsibility to PetroEcuador for the condition of any of
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concluded that Cabrera's "sole interest was to facilitate the result
sought by plaintiffs' counsel and the Government of Ecuador: a
windfall damages judgment against a U.S. oil company that never
operated in Ecuador and had nothing to do with the Consortium.""
The credibility was further undermined by evidence indicating
Plaintiffs' representatives had authored significant portions of his
report." This revelation led Plaintiffs to seek new reports
the sites in the former concession area," that "the majority of the sites included in the
Cabrera Report's damages assessment are sites that were not TexPet's responsibility to
clean-up" and that Stratus was instructed "to ignore the ongoing clean-up in the former
concession area").
57 CHEVRON CORP., REBUTTAL TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT REPORT, supra note
54, at 3. See also Chevron Corporation's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on All Claims, Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses, and
Summary Judgment on Defendants' Affirmative Defense of Collateral Estoppel at 9,
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 1 1-CV-0691, 2011 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 100409 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) [hereinafter Chevron Motion Memo]. Chevron's Memorandum quotes Plaintiffs'
representative Steven Donziger as stating:
[T]his is Ecuador, okay ... You can say whatever you want and at the end of
the day, there's a thousand people around the courthouse, you're going to get
what you want .... [I]f we take our existing evidence on groundwater
contamination, which admittedly is right below the source ... [a]nd wanted to
extrapolate based on nothing other than our, um theory .. . [w]e can do it. And
we can get money for it. Because at the end of the day, this is all for the Court
just a bunch of smoke and mirrors and bullshit.
Id. at 9.
58 See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(finding a "likelihood" that the Cabrera report was "planned" by some of Plaintiffs'
representatives, written "in substantial part" by persons other than Cabrera and submitted
to the Provincial Court as Cabrera's independent work product without disclosure of its
true authorship); see also Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235, 260 (2012)
(opinion on partial summary judgment motion) (concluding the Cabrera report "falsely
or, at least, deceptively stated that it had been 'prepared by . . . Cabrera' with the help of
'my technical team, which consists of impartial professionals'); Beltman Statement,
supra note 43, IT 11, 17, 22, 25 (stating "[a]t no point . . . did I have an understanding
that Cabrera was preparing his own report," described his authorship of "substantial
parts" of the Cabrera report "in the first person as though it was written by Richard
Cabrera," and detailing Stratus' preparation of eleven of the twenty-four annexes
attached to the report and his preparation of additional materials on behalf of Cabrera
designed "to increase the damages assessed by billions of dollars"); Letter from the
Burford Group, to Steven R. Donziger, et al., 1-2 (Sept. 29, 2011) (on file with author)
(describing the alleged authorship of the Cabrera report by Plaintiffs' representatives as
"fraud" and an example of "misrepresentation and disingenuous conduct"); see infra
notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
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supporting Cabrera's conclusions.5 9  The credibility of these
reports was open to attack on the bases that the new authors
completed their work in less than one month, did not visit
Ecuador, and did not conduct new tests, but rather relied upon
Cabrera's report.60
Chevron also claimed that Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa
and others applied political pressure on the Provincial Court.' In
particular, Chevron pointed to President Correa's order to
Ecuador's Prosecutor General to indict persons involved in the
negotiation of the remediation agreements and release.62
Additional sources of pressure included the Ecuadorian Attorney
General's office, members of Ecuador's Constituent Assembly,
and protestors allegedly organized by Plaintiffs.
59 Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 611. The district court described such efforts
as a "cleansing operation." Id. at 610.
60 Id. at 611; see also Chevron Corp., 886 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (finding that six of
the seven experts did not visit Ecuador and concluding that four experts relied upon
Cabrera's data and conclusions).
61 This pressure included references to Plaintiffs' counsel as "compafieros" and
pledging to assist in evidence gathering. See, e.g., Chevron Rebuttal Brief, supra note
45, at 8; Chevron Notice of Arbitration, supra note 42, at 9-10 (alleging the possibility of
dismissal or criminal prosecution of any judge who issued opinions contrary to the
government's interests and quoting President Correa as denouncing the "barbarity
committed by that multinational corporation [Texaco]").
62 See, e.g., Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (quoting President Correa as
urging the criminal prosecution of the PetroEcuador officials and Texaco's local counsel
as "homeland-selling lawyers"); TEXACO PETROLEUM, ECUADOR AND THE LAWSUIT
AGAINST CHEVRON, supra note 55, at 7 (quoting President Correa as calling upon
Ecuador's Prosecutor General to indict the "miserable Mafiosi" involved in the
negotiation of the remediation agreement). Two Ecuadorian attorneys who represented
Texaco in the negotiation of the remediation agreement were charged with crimes by the
Ecuadorian Prosecutor General in August 2008. See Chevron Notice of Arbitration,
supra note 42, at 13-14.
63 See, e.g., TEXACO PETROLEUM, ECUADOR AND THE LAWSUIT AGAINST CHEVRON,
supra note 55, at 7 (alleging that Plaintiffs organized a courtroom protest on June 14,
2006, and assailed the presiding judge's chambers); Chevron Notice of Arbitration,
supra note 42, at 8-9 (quoting correspondence from Ecuadorian Deputy Attorney
General Martha Escobar to one of Plaintiffs' attorneys detailing efforts by the Attorney
General's Office "to nullify or undermine the value of the remediation contract and the
final act"); Chevron Rebuttal Brief, supra note 45, at 8-9 (referring to the endorsement
of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit by two members of the Constituent Assembly). Plaintiffs'
representative Steven Donziger described these tactics as "something you would never
do in the United States, but Ecuador ... this is how the game is played, it's dirty." Id.
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D. Litigation in Ecuador: The Judgment and Appeal
In February 2011, the Provincial Court concluded that Texaco
violated provisions of Ecuadorian law relating to hydrocarbon
operations and water resource protection." These violations
supported entry of a judgment against Chevron totaling more than
$17.2 billion, including $8.64 billion for environmental
remediation and $2.3 billion for personal injuries and property
damage.6 ' The court also assessed $8.64 billion in punitive
damages, which was to be vacated if Chevron issued a public
apology within fifteen days of entry of the Judgment.6 6 The entire
amount of damages was to be placed in a trust to be administered
by Frente or its designee to pay for remedial measures.67
The Provincial Court addressed some of Chevron's defenses.
The court held that Chevron had attempted to evade liability
through its merger with Texaco.6 ' Given this illicit purpose, the
court concluded that it was appropriate to disregard corporate
formalities and impose liability for Texaco's actions directly upon
Chevron.69  The court also disregarded any separation between
Texaco, Texaco Ecuador and Compania Texaco de Petroleos del
Ecuador due to undercapitalization and a perceived lack of both
administrative autonomy and separation of assets.70
The court refused to enforce the remediation agreement and
release between the Ecuadorian government and Texaco on the
basis that they were not binding on Ecuador's citizens." It
concluded that the application of the Environmental Management
6 Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 002-2003, at 62-64, 70 (Sucumbios
Provincial Ct. of Justice of Nueva Loja, Feb. 14, 2011) (Ecuador).
65 The portion of the award devoted to environmental injuries included soil
remediation ($5 billion), groundwater remediation ($600 million), flora and fauna
restoration ($200 million) and delivery of potable water ($150 million). Id. at 177-82.
Health related damages included hydrocarbon exposure ($1.4 billion) and cancer ($800
million). Property-related damages included forced displacement as a result of
hydrocarbon contamination ($100 million). Id. at 170-71, 183-84.
66 Id. at 185-86.
67 Id. at 186-87.
68 Id. at 11-13.
69 Id. at 13, 15.
70 Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 002-2003 at 20-25 (Sucumbios
Provincial Ct. of Justice of Nueva Loja, Feb. 14, 2011).
71 Id. at 30-32.
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Act was not retroactive, as it merely identified the court
possessing jurisdiction and the procedures by which previously
existing substantive rights could be asserted.7 2 The court also
refused to condemn the circumstances surrounding the
appointment of Cabrera and the delivery of his report and declined
to conduct any additional inquiry into these circumstances, as they
were most likely isolated and, in the court's opinion, would not
affect the outcome.7 ' Finally, no portion of the damages award
could be assessed against PetroEcuador, as it was not a party to the
litigation and its complicity, if any, could not extinguish or lessen
Chevron's liability. 74
The Sole Division of the Provincial Court of Justice of
Sucumbios affirmed the Judgment on appeal in January 2012."
The appellate court rejected Chevron's previously noted defenses
on the same grounds as the Provincial Court.76 The environmental
and personal injuries resulting from Texaco's activities were
"legally proven," and thus there was no reason to modify the
Provincial Court's holdings with respect to their type or amounts.
The court also ratified the punitive damages award in order to
"discourage [Chevron's] type of procedural conduct" and set "an
example of what should not occur in a legal action. ,78
Furthermore, the court refused to overturn the Judgment on the
basis that Plaintiffs had provided assistance to the Provincial Court
in drafting its opinion because Chevron had failed to raise this
allegation at trial, and it was unlikely to have been a decisive
factor in the outcome.79  The appellate court declined to address
72 Id. at 27-28.
73 Id. at 50, 57-58, 99.
74 Id. at 123.
75 Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 2011-0106, at 15-16 (Sucumbios
Provincial Ct. of Justice of Nueva Loja, App. Div., Jan. 3, 2012) (Ecuador). The
appellate court's sole modification of the Provincial Court's opinion was the attribution
of mercury contamination as a result of the Consortium's activities. Id. at 16.
76 Aguinda, No. 002-2003 at 3, 6-7, 10
77 Id. at 12.
78 Id. at 15.
79 See Clarification Decision at 4-5, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 2011-
0106 (Sucumbios Provincial Ct. of Justice of Nueva Loja, App. Div., Jan. 3, 2012)
(refusing to "make a pronouncement on the interminable and reciprocal accusations over
misconduct of some of the parties' attorneys, experts, or contractors .. . [as these
accusations] could not affect the final result of the lawsuit").
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other allegations of fraud in the proceedings in deference to
possible investigation by Ecuadorian criminal authorities and
pending litigation in the United States."
On January 20, 2012, Chevron filed a cassation petition
seeking review of the Judgment by Ecuador's National Court of
Justice.8 ' This petition was accepted on February 17, 2012, and
the case was still pending at the time of preparation of this
article.8 2 There have been several new developments in the
months since the filing of the appeal, two of which are of primary
importance. The first development is the re-election of President
Correa to a second term in February 2013. Thus, it is unlikely
that political pressure on the Ecuadorian judiciary relating to this
litigation will abate in the near future.
The second development is allegations the Provincial Court
judge responsible for the Judgment was bribed in return for
authorship of his opinion by Plaintiffs' representatives. These
allegations were raised in pending U.S. proceedings arising from
the Ecuadorian litigation. In a memorandum filed in January 2013
in U.S. District Court, Chevron alleged that representatives of
Plaintiffs paid a former Ecuadorian judge $1,000 per month to
draft rulings favorable to Plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio litigation
starting in 2008.84 Chevron further alleged that the trial judge and
the former judge accepted $500,000 in proceeds collected from
Chevron in return for allowing Plaintiffs' representatives to author
the Judgment. The Judgment was alleged to have been drafted
by Plaintiffs' representatives, edited by the former judge, and
80 Id. at 5.
81 See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(discussing Chevron's cassation petition in opinion on motion for partial summary
judgment).
82 Id.
83 See William Neuman, President Correa Handily Wins Re-election in Ecuador,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/world/americas/rafael-
correa-wins-re-election-in-ecuador.html.
84 Chevron Motion Memo, supra note 57, at 2, 13 (alleging Plaintiffs'
representatives made these payments in return for "favorable rulings," "making the case
move quickly," and "ensuring that the orders . . . went the [Plaintiffs'] way").
85 Id. (alleging the trial judge "cut a deal with [Plaintiffs] allowing them to draft
the judgment, which [the former judge] then modestly edited, in exchange for a bribe of
$500,000, to be paid out of [Plaintiffs'] judgment proceeds").
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signed by the Provincial Court.86 Chevron produced the former
judge's affidavit that described his role in the purported plan and
identified passages from internal memoranda drafted by Plaintiffs
that were not introduced into the record but were incorporated
verbatim in the Judgment.87 Although the veracity of these
allegations has yet to be determined, these allegations raise further
doubts about the integrity of the Ecuadorian judicial system and
the due process afforded to Chevron in the Lago Agrio litigation.
III. Related Litigation in Other Venues
A. Recognition Proceeding in Canada
On May 30, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their Statement of Claim
seeking recognition of the Judgment in Canada." Plaintiffs allege
Texaco's consent to recognize any judgment entered in Ecuador is
binding on Chevron, and the facts, findings, and conclusions of
law contained in the Judgment are res judicata between Chevron
and Plaintiffs.89 Plaintiffs claim Chevron Canada Limited is
wholly-owned and exclusively managed by Chevron.90 Chevron
provides administrative, financial, management, and technology
support for its Canadian subsidiary, and its management is
conducted by individuals and bodies who report directly to
86 Id
87 Id. at 18-23 (citing internal memoranda relating to holding Chevron liable for
acts of Texaco's Ecuadorian subsidiaries, the presence of "dangerous, area-wide
contamination," remediation costs, causation and creation of a trust to assist in the
allocation of judgment proceeds).
88 Statement of Claim, supra note 1, at 1. The Statement of Claim named Chevron
Corporation, Chevron Canada Limited and Chevron Canada Finance Limited as
defendants. Chevron Canada Finance Limited is an Alberta corporation with its
principal place of business in Calgary. Canada Fact Sheet, CHEVRON.COM,
http://www.chevron.com/DOCUMENTS/PDF/CANADAFACTSHEET.PDF (last
visited Oct. 2, 2013). The litigation against Chevron Canada Finance Limited was
discontinued in August 2012. Chevron Canada Limited is a seventh level indirect
subsidiary of Chevron wholly owned by Chevron Canada Capital Company and
organized pursuant to the laws of British Columbia with its registered office in Calgary.
Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corp., 2013 ONSC 2527, para. 17 (Can.). Chevron Canada Limited
conducts retail and commercial fueling operations and lubricants distribution in British
Columbia and Alberta in addition to the operation of a refinery in Burnaby, British
Columbia. CHEVRON CORP., CHEVRON IN CANADA 1 (2011).
89 Statement of Claim, supra note 1, at 5-6.
90 Id. at 6.
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Chevron's executive committee.9 1 The financial performance of
Chevron Canada Limited is consolidated with and reported on
behalf of Chevron, and Chevron guarantees its debts.92 According
to Plaintiffs, these relationships render joinder of Chevron Canada
Limited necessary and support a declaration that its shares be
deemed eligible to satisfy the Judgment and support the
appointment of a receiver to assume control of Chevron's
ownership interest.93
B. Proceedings in the United States
There are four related proceedings in the United States that
may affect recognition of the Judgment in Canada. The first case
involved claims asserted by Oriente residents alleging that the
Consortium's operations caused them to develop cancer.9 4 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
dismissed these claims in 2007.95 The district court concluded that
the claims were baseless and "likely a smaller piece of some larger
91 Id. at 6-7.
92 Id. at 7.
93 Id. at 7-8, para. 1. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice declined to address the
merits of the case and issued a stay order in the litigation on May 1, 2013. Yaiguaje,
2013 ONSC 2527, para. 109. The court concluded that Plaintiffs had "no hope of
success in their assertion that the corporate veil of Chevron Canada should be pierced
and ignored so that its assets become exigible to satisfy a Judgment against its ultimate
parent." Id. The stay order was based upon the court's conclusions that: (1) Chevron
owned no assets in Ontario at any time; (2) Chevron did not conduct business in Ontario;
(3) Chevron does not own the shares of Chevron Canada Limited; and (4) Chevron and
Chevron Canada Limited maintain separate boards of directors, budgets, operations and
tax returns. Id para. 89-90, 93, 99-102. These findings brought the court to conclude:
[w]ere I to permit the plaintiffs' action to proceed to the next step - the filing
of statements of defence and the adjudication of the defences Chevron intends
to assert against the Ecuadorian Judgment - the evidence disclosed that a bitter,
protracted and expensive recognition fight would ensue consuming significant
time and judicial resources of this Court . . .. Ontario is not the place for that
fight. Ontario courts should be reluctant to dedicate their resources to disputes
where, in dollars and cents terms, there is nothing to fight over. In my view, the
parties should take their fight elsewhere to some jurisdiction where any ultimate
recognition of the Ecuadorian Judgment will have a practical effect.
Id para. I11. The Superior Court's order is presently on appeal.
94 Gonzalez v. Texaco, Inc., No. C 06-02820, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56622, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2007).
95 Id at *9.
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scheme against defendants."9 6 Three of the Oriente residents'
attorneys were sanctioned pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 for their failure to conduct adequate factual
investigation prior to commencing litigation.9 7 In so doing, the
district court described the case as consisting of "bogus claims that
should never have been on the books." 98
A second set of opinions arose from discovery requests
initiated by Chevron seeking evidence to be utilized in Ecuador
and before the Permanent Court of Arbitration.99 The most
extensive findings addressing the Ecuadorian litigation were made
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in In re the Application of Chevron Corporation.'00 In
permitting Chevron's requests for documents and testimony, the
district court concluded that there was "evidence of possible fraud
and misconduct" by one of Plaintiffs' counsel whose activities
"had little to do with the performance of legal services and a great
deal to do with political activity, intimidation of the Ecuadorian
courts, attempts to procure criminal prosecutions for the purpose
of extracting a settlement, and presenting a message to the world
media."'o' The district court found politics, intimidation, and
96 Id.
97 Gonzalez v. Texaco, Inc., No. C 06-02820, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81222, at
*33 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides, in relevant
part, that:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney ... is
certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances ...
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(b)(3). The amount of the sanctions was $45,000. Gonzalez, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81222, at *41. The plaintiffs' attorneys in the California litigation are
different from Plaintiffs' attorneys in Ecuador. See Id. at *4-6.
98 Gonzalez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81222, at *40.
99 Chevron's requests were initiated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which provides,
in part, that "[t]he district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may
order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for
use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal." 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2013).
100 749 F. Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
101 Id. at 144, 157-58.
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corruption may have influenced the outcome of the Ecuadorian
litigation.'0 2 It also determined that the Cabrera report was not the
sole work product of a neutral and independent expert,10 3 and that
another expert's report was submitted without authorization.'104
The court also found "more than a little evidence" that some of
these activities came within the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.' 5 Similar
conclusions have been reached by other U.S. courts in related
discovery proceedings.106
102 Id. at 145 (quoting one of Plaintiffs' counsel as stating "[y]ou can solve
anything with politics as long as the judges are intelligent enough to understand the
politics ... they don't have to be intelligent enough to understand the law, just as long as
they understand the politics"); see also id at 146 (finding that one of Plaintiffs' counsel
"attempted to intimidate the Ecuadorian judges [and] obtain political support for the ...
lawsuit"); id. at 147 (quoting one of Plaintiffs' counsel as stating "[t]he only language
that I believe this judge is going to understand is one of pressure, intimidation and
humiliation," that such conduct was necessary given that "[t]he judicial system is so
utterly weak," and that Ecuadorian judges are "all corrupt! It's - it's their birthright to
be corrupt"); id. at 158-59 (discussing the organization of "pressure demonstrations at
the court").
103 Id. at 144-45, 150, 152 (concluding there was substantial evidence that "(1)
Cabrera was appointed as a result of Lago Agrio plaintiffs' ex parte contacts with and
pressure on the Ecuadorian courts, (2) at least part of his report was written by
consultants retained by the Lago Agrio plaintiffs, and (3) the report was passed off as
Cabrera's independent work").
104 Id. at 152. See also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
105 In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d. 141, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
106 See, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 166 (3d Cir. 2011) (commenting
that a conflict of interest relating to one of the Plaintiffs' consultants was "sufficient to
make a prima facie showing of fraud that satisfies the first element of the showing
necessary to apply the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege"); In re
Chevron Corp., No. ll-24599-CV, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123315, at *6-7 (S.D. Fla.
June 12, 2012) (finding that Chevron had obtained "mounds of evidence ... that
suggests that the judgment itself was ... ghostwritten"); Chevron Corp. v. E-Tech Int'l,
No. 10cvl146-IEG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94396, at *17 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010)
(applying the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege as "[t]here is ample
evidence in the record that the Ecuadorian Plaintiffs secretly provided information to Mr.
Cabrera, who was supposedly a neutral court-appointed expert, and colluded with Mr.
Cabrera to make it look like the opinions were his own"); In re Chevron Corp., No. 10-
MC-21JHILFG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119943, at *6 (D.N.M. Sept. 1, 2010)
(describing the conduct of the Plaintiffs' representatives as sending "shockwaves through
the nation's legal communities" and "inappropriate, unethical and perhaps illegal");
Chevron Corp. v. Camp, No. 1:10mc27, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97440, at *16
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2010) (concluding that "the concept of fraud is universal, and that
what has blatantly occurred in this matter would in fact be considered fraud by any
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More recent litigation filed by Chevron in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in February
2011 accuses Plaintiffs, two of their attorneys, Frente, and an
environmental consulting company of colluding with non-party
co-conspirators to corrupt the Provincial Court and extort a
settlement payment from Chevron.'0 7 The primary set of
allegations accused the group of pressuring the Ecuadorian court
and manufacturing evidence.' A second set of allegations
accused the group of colluding with the Ecuadorian government to
bring sham criminal charges against Chevron's local counsel.o' A
third set of allegations claimed that the group launched attacks
upon Chevron utilizing false media reports and statements to U.S.
federal and state government officials and federal courts, tampered
with witnesses, and withheld documents."' These activities were
court.. .. If such conduct does not amount to fraud in a particular country, then that
country has larger problems than an oil spill").
107 Complaint, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. I1-CV-0691, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 100469, at 17-97, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2011). The environmental consulting
company, Stratus Consulting, Inc., was dismissed as a defendant upon the filing of the
Beltman Statement and its disavowal of reports prepared on behalf of Plaintiffs. See
Chevron Drops Colorado Firm from Fraud Lawsuit, DENVER POST, Apr. 11, 2013,
available at http://www.denverpost.com/colorado/ci_23008218.
108 Complaint, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. I 1-CV-0691, at 31-73 (alleging
utilization of pressure tactics to influence the Provincial Court, collusion with
Ecuadorian government officials, inducement of expert witnesses to prepare and file
biased and false reports and misconduct associated with the preparation and authorship
of the Cabrera report).
109 Id. at 73-78.
110 Id. at 78-114. There is evidence that media reports and other public statements
have had an effect upon investors and other interested groups. See, e.g., SIMON
BILLENNESS & SANFORD LEWIS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL
RISKS TO CHEVRON CORPORATION FROM AGUINDA v. CHEVRONTEXACO 3 (May 2011)
(concluding Chevron's litigation strategy "may lead some investors to question the
adequacy of the company's public statements and disclosures and whether the board and
management are fulfilling their fiduciary duties to properly manage this significant risk
to the company's business and value"); Letter from Jonas Kron et al., Vice-President,
Trillium Asset Management Corporation, to Office of Chief Counsel, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission 1-2, 4 (May 19, 2011) (on file with author) (requesting a review
of statements contained within Chevron's 2010 annual report in order to determine if
there has been adequate disclosure or material misrepresentations regarding the effect of
the Judgment upon Chevron's business interests); Letter from Thomas P. DiNapoli, et
al., Comptroller, State of New York, to Chevron Corporation 1-2 (undated) (on file with
author) (requesting Chevron's board of directors disclose to shareholders "the risks to its
business and its operations from any enforcement of the [Judgment]" and "[r]e-evaluate
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alleged to violate federal and state laws"' and entitle Chevron to
awards of general, treble, and punitive damages." 2 The case
remained pending at the time of the preparation of this article." 3
Finally, in February 2013, forty-two members of the Huaorani
people, a group residing in the Oriente region of Ecuador, initiated
whether endless litigation is the best strategy"). But see Complaint at 2, 25-45, Chevron
Corp. v. DiNapoli, N.Y. State Comm'n on Pub. Ethics (undated) (claiming DiNapoli
violated New York state laws governing the ethics of public officials through numerous
improper contacts with Plaintiffs' representatives including alleged receipt of a $60,000
campaign contribution from persons affiliated with Plaintiffs).
Ill Nine of the named defendants were alleged to have engaged in a pattern of
activities in violation of the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). Complaint, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11-0691, at 119-33; see also 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2013) (defining "pattern of racketeering activity" as consisting of "at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which has occurred after the effective date
of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years . . . after the commission
of a prior act of racketeering activity"). The specific racketeering activities alleged in
the complaint were: (1) extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951
(2013)); (2) extortion in violation of New York state law (N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 110.00,
155.05(2)(e), 155.42 (2013)); (3) mail and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2013));
(4) money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A)(2013)); (5) obstruction of justice (18
U.S.C. § 1503 (2013)); and (6) witness tampering (18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2013)). See
Complaint, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. I I-CV-0691, at 121-27. These actions were
also alleged to constitute a conspiracy in violation of RICO. Id. at 17-97; see also 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2013) (providing that it shall be unlawful to conspire to engage in
racketeering activities). State law claims of fraud, tortious interference with contract,
trespass to chattels, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy were asserted against all
defendants with the exception of a claim for relief alleging violation of the New York
Judiciary Law, which was limited to one of the defendants' attorneys and his law office.
Complaint, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11-CV-0691, at 119-46. The New York
Judiciary Law provides, in part, that "[a]n attorney or counselor who ... [i]s guilty of
any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the
court or any party ... is guilty of a misdemeanor and ... forfeits to the party injured
treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action." N.Y. JUD. LAW § 487 (2010).
112 Complaint, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. I 1-CV-0691, at 146-47.
113 See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 230, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(granting defendants' motion to dismiss the claims sounding in fraud, tortious
interference with contract, trespass to chattel, and unjust enrichment, but refusing to
dismiss the remaining claims, including those based upon RICO and the New York
Judiciary Law). Chevron's voluminous filings in this case, including 6,000,000 pages of
motions and related material and a 15,000 page privilege log, have caused the defendants
to characterize the proceedings as progressing at "a ridiculous, out of control pace" that
deprives them of their due process rights consistent with Chevron's "we will bury you
strategy." Letter from Craig Smyser et al., Attorneys for Defendants, to Lewis A.
Kaplan, U.S. District Court Judge, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York 1-3 (Mar. 1, 2013) (on file with author).
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litigation against one of Plaintiffs' attorneys, Frente and twenty
other unnamed parties (named defendants).1 14 The complaint
alleges that the named defendants were not the lawful
representatives of the Huaorani people during the Lago Agrio
proceedings because of the absence of a signed retainer
agreement."' Despite the absence of such an agreement, the
Huaorani plaintiffs claim that the defendants owe a fiduciary duty
to protect the Huaorani's interest in the Judgment, provide
notification of enforcement efforts, respect the interests of third
parties in any proceeds that may be collected, provide an
accounting of the proceeds of any attempts to settle, and provide
remittance of the Huaorani's "rightful portion.""' The complaint
expresses concern that the named defendants will wrongfully
dissipate proceeds derived from the judgment through funneling of
monies to "off-shore havens beyond the reach of U.S. Courts,"
payments to investors who have purchased more than $10 million
in interests in return for litigation financing, and seizure by the
Ecuadorian government, which may claim as much as 90% of the
proceeds." 7 Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration establishing their
114 Complaint, Huani v. Donziger, No. 151372/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 2013).
'15 Id. 54-55.
116 Id. 155.
117 Id. TT 65-68; see also Daniel Fisher, Litigation-Finance Contract Reveals How
Investors Back Lawsuits, FORBES, June 7, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2011/06/07/litigation-finance-contract-reveals-how-investors-back-lawsuits
(claiming Treca Financial Solutions, a Cayman Islands entity, and affiliated with Burford
Capital, a publicly traded investment firm based on the British island of Guernsey,
invested $4 million in the Ecuadorian litigation in November 2010 in exchange for a
1.5% stake in any collected proceeds with the possibility of increasing its stake to 5.5%
with an investment of an additional $11 million); Roger Parloff, Have you got a piece of
this lawsuit?, FORTUNE, June 28, 2011, http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/
2011/06/28/have-you-got-a-piece-of-this-lawsuit (claiming that the agreement between
the Plaintiffs and Burford created a "distribution waterfall" in which Plaintiffs would not
receive proceeds until "eight tiers of funders, attorneys, and 'advisers' . . . have fed at the
trough"). This financing was utilized to retain the law firm of Patton Boggs to act on
behalf of Plaintiffs. Paul M. Barrett, Back a Lawsuit, Get a Return, Bus. WK., Jan. 12,
2012, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/back-a-lawsuit-get-a-return-0 1122012.
html. Burford sold its interest to a third party in December 2010. Press Release, Burford
Capital, Burford Reports Continued Activity and Entry into the U.K. Market 4 (Dec. 12,
2011) (on file with author). In September 2011, Burford accused the Plaintiffs of
engaging in fraudulent conduct with respect to the preparation of the Cabrera report. See
Letter from the Burford Group to Steven R. Donziger, et al., supra note 58, at 1-3
(describing the alleged authorship of the Cabrera report by Plaintiffs' representatives as a
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right to proceeds derived from the Judgment, an accounting for
and imposition of a constructive trust upon any such proceeds, and
damages for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment."'
These claims remained pending at the time of preparation of this
article.
C. Proceedings before the Permanent Court ofArbitration
A final related proceeding is Chevron's claims against the
Republic of Ecuador in the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Filed
in September 2009, Chevron's complaint alleged that the
Ecuadorian government's collusion with Plaintiffs and abuse of
the criminal justice system violated the Ecuador-United States
Bilateral Investment Treaty."' The court determined that the
claims were admissible, and consequently possessed jurisdiction in
February 2012.120 Chevron's claims have been described by the
material breach of the funding agreement through "misrepresentations .. . other material
failures . . [and] fraud," alleging the existence of a "multi-month scheme to deceive and
defraud in order to secure desperately needed funding from Treca, all the while
concealing material information and misrepresenting critical facts in the fear that we
would have walked away had we known the true state of affairs," and concluding "it is
now clear that you were willing to do and say anything to attract new funding"). See
also Roger Parloff, Investment Fund: We were Defrauded in Suit Against Chevron,
FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 2013, http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/01/10/burford-capital-
chevron-ecuador. In December 2011, Burford announced that "[flurther developments
have led [it] to conclude that no further financing will be provided." Press Release,
Burford Capital, supra, at 4. Burford's remaining stake in the outcome of the
Ecuadorian litigation was relinquished to Chevron in April 2013. See Roger Parloff,
Litigation Finance Firm in Chevron Case Says It was Duped by Patton Boggs, FORTUNE,
Apr. 17, 2013, http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/04/17/burford-patton-boggs-
chevron-suit.
118 Complaint, Donziger, No. 151372/2013, 174-118.
119 Chevron Notice of Arbitration, supra note 42, at 7-16. Chevron alleged
Ecuador failed to provide fair and equitable treatment and effective means by which to
assert claims, impaired investments through arbitrary and discriminatory measures, and
failed to accord national treatment. Id. at 16; see also Investment Treaty, U.S.-Ecuador,
arts. 11(1), II(3)(a-c), 11(7), Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-15. Chevron seeks
relief providing that: (1) Texaco has no further liability for environmental and health
impacts associated with the Consortium; (2) Ecuador's actions are in breach of the
bilateral investment treaty; (3) Texaco and all related entities were released from liability
effective in September 1998; (4) Ecuador and PetroEcuador are exclusively liable for
any remaining environmental and health impacts in the Oriente; and (5) Ecuador
indemnify, protect and defend Chevron from any payment of damages. Chevron Notice
of Arbitration, supra note 42, at 17-18.
120 See Third Interim Award, supra note 7, 4.95-4.96.
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court as "serious and not ... incredible, frivolous or vexatious."l21
The court has repeatedly directed Ecuador to take all judicial,
legislative and executive measures necessary to suspend or cause
to be suspended the recognition and enforcement of the Judgment
within and without Ecuador during the pendency of its
proceedings. 122 In February 2013, the court held that Ecuador's
continued efforts to enforce the judgment in Canada, as well as
related proceedings in Brazil and Argentina, violated previous
orders regarding maintenance of the status quo and required the
issuance of an order directed at Ecuador to show cause why it
should not be required to compensate Chevron for any resultant
harm.12 3  The show cause order and Chevron's claims remained
pending at the time of preparation of this article.124
IV. The Recognition of Foreign Judgments in Canada
A. Background
Recognition and enforcement of judgments in Canada are
governed by provincial law.125  Recognition proceedings are
121 Id. 4.58.
122 See, e.g., Second Interim Award on Interim Measures, Chevron Corp. v.
Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, T 3(i-ii) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012); First
Interim Award on Interim Measures, Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case
No. 2009-23, 2(i-ii) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012); Order for Interim Measures, Chevron Corp.
v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, (E)(i-ii) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011); Order
on Interim Measures, Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23,
1(i-ii) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010).
123 See Fourth Interim Award on Interim Measures, Chevron Corp. v. Republic of
Ecuador, PCA Case N. 2009-23, 79, 81 (Perm. Ct. Arb., Feb. 7, 2013). The court
found Ecuador had failed to prevent the Judgment from becoming "final, enforceable
and subject to execution" in violation of previous orders on interim measures, which
failures could not be excused based upon its disagreement with such interim awards or
constraints under Ecuadorian law. Id. 78-79. Ecuador's non-compliance presented
risks to Chevron that were "difficult now to exaggerate" and "imperil[ed] to a very
significant extent the overall fairness and the efficacy of these arbitration proceedings."
Id. 85.
124 Ecuador Lawsuit: Facts about Chevron and Texaco in Ecuador, CHEVRON,
http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/, (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
125 MARKUS KOEHNEN & AMANDA KLEIN, THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CANADA 2 (2010); see also IGOR ELLYN & EVELYN PEREZ
YOUSSOUFIAN, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS IN CANADA
3 (2009), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/enforcement-of-foreign-
judgments-in-cana-72506/ (noting the absence of "pan-Canadian uniformity" regarding
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resolved on a province-by-province basis although all provinces,
except Quebec, have mutual registration arrangements.126 The
Supreme Court of Canada is empowered to resolve significant
differences between provinces.127 However, appeals are only
heard with leave of the court in matters of national importance.'28
As a result, disputes concerning foreign judgments are primarily
resolved by provincial courts.12 9 These courts, other than those in
Quebec, traditionally utilized common law principles derived from
the English system and other Commonwealth countries.'3 0
Reliance upon these principles was overturned by the Supreme
Court of Canada's 1990 decision in Morguard Investments Ltd. v.
DeSavoye.131
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments).
126 See, e.g., Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.5 (Can.),
applied by 0. Reg. 298/99 (Can.).
127 KOEHNEN & KLEIN, supra note 125, at 2.
128 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 § 40 (Can.).
129 See Janet Walker, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and
Arbitral Awards in Canada, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAw 64-1 (Theodore Eisenberg ed.,
2003).
130 For a discussion of English common law, see, e.g., Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote,
[1894] A.C. 670 (P.C.); Emanuel v. Symon, (1907) [1908] 1 K.B. 302 (C.A.). There was
growing support for reciprocity within the English and Canadian legal systems beginning
in the 1950s. See, e.g., Travers v. Holley, [1953] 2 All. E.R. 794, 800 (C.A.) (holding
that the sovereign and territorial interests of national courts are not infringed "where it is
found that the municipal law is not peculiar to the forum of one country, but corresponds
with the law of a second country"); Marcotte v. Megson, [1987] 19 B.C.L.R. 2d 300
(Cty. Ct.) (upholding reciprocity of judgments within Canada in personal actions). See
also Gilbert D. Kennedy, Reciprocity in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments: The
Implications of Travers v. Holley, 32 CAN. BAR REV. 359 (1954).
131 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (recognizing a judgment entered by an Alberta court in
British Columbia). Recognition was based on comity, "an idea based not simply on
respect for the dictates of a foreign sovereign, but on the convenience, nay necessity, in a
world where legal authority is divided among sovereign states." Id. at 1096. Failure to
extend comity to judgments on an interprovincial basis would result in injustice, disrupt
normal patterns of life, and was inconsistent with the intention of the Canadian
Constitution to create a single country. Id. at 1096, 1099. These concerns led the Court
to conclude that "the courts in one province should give full faith and credit ... to the
judgments given by a court in another province or territory, so long as that court has
properly, or appropriately exercised jurisdiction in the action." Id. at 102. The Court
identified forum non conveniens, fraud, and public policy as defenses to inter-provincial
recognition. Id. at 1110.
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B. The Public Policy Defense to the Recognition ofForeign
Judgments
Morguard left undecided the issue of the proper approach to
the recognition of non-Canadian judgments.13 2 Some provincial
courts applied Morguard to non-Canadian judgments, but such
application was not uniform.'33 This issue was addressed at the
national level in Beals v. Saldanha,134 in which the Supreme Court
of Canada closely equated foreign and domestic judgments.
Beals involved a Florida state court judgment entered against
Ontario residents.135  The Supreme Court of Canada found
"compelling reasons" to expand Morguard's application to non-
Canadian judgments and no "principled reason not to do so." 36
These reasons included the need to secure transactions which
"necessarily underlie the modern concept of private international
law." 3 7 The court concluded that comity, the growing number of
132 Morguard dealt with the recognition of a judgment obtained in Alberta and
sought to be enforced in British Columbia. Id. Although the case did not directly
address foreign judgments, many courts applied the real and substantial connection test
articulated by Morguard. Walker, supra note 129, at 64-18.
133 See, e.g., Old N. State Brewing Co., Inc., v. Newlands Servs., Inc., (1998)
[1999] 58 B.C.L.R. 3d 144 (Can. B.C. C.A.) (North Carolina judgment); Moses v. Shore
Boat Builders, Ltd., (1993) [1994] 83 B.C.L.R. 2d 177 (Can. B.C. C.A.) (Alaska
judgment); United States v. Ivey, [1996] 30 O.R. 3d 370 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (Michigan
judgment); Arrowmaster, Inc. v. Unique Forming, Ltd., 1993 CanLII 5510 (Can. Ont.
S.C.) (Illinois judgment).
134 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416.
135 The judgment debtors sold vacant real property located in Florida valued at U.S.
$8,000 to two Florida residents upon which the purchasers constructed a model home for
use in their construction business. Beals, 3 S.C.R. 416, para. 5-16. The property subject
to the sale was misidentified in the contract, which resulted in construction of the model
home on property that was not owned by the judgment debtors. Id. The purchasers filed
suit in Florida state court. Id. The judgment debtors initially appeared in the case but
abandoned their defense on the advice of counsel that a Florida state court judgment was
unenforceable in Canada. Id. The Florida court subsequently entered a default judgment
against the judgment debtors in the amount of U.S. $210,000 in compensatory damages
and U.S. $50,000 in punitive damages. Id. The purchasers sought recognition in
Canada, but the Ontario Court (General Division) declared the judgment unenforceable
on the basis that the damages had been fraudulently calculated. Id. This result was
reversed by the Ontario Court of Appeal based upon its conclusion that fraud and public
policy were not applicable to petitions for recognition. Beals, 3 S.C.R. 416, para. 5-16.
The judgment debtors sought review in the Supreme Court of Canada. Id
136 Id. para. 19.
137 Id. para. 26-27 (concluding the need to accommodate "the flow of wealth, skills
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international business transactions, and increased movement of
goods and people required modernization of private international
law through liberal recognition policies.'3 8
After finding the existence of a "real and substantial
connection" between the judgment debtors and the State of
Florida,'39 the court then analyzed the applicability of the public
policy defense to recognition. The public policy defense prevents
the recognition of foreign judgments that are "contrary to the
Canadian concept of justice." 4 0  According to the Court, the
crucial issue was whether the foreign law upon which the
judgment was based is contrary to basic morality.14' Given the
serious nature of impeachment of foreign law, the Court concluded
that the defense is not "a remedy to be lightly used" and should
have "a narrow application." 42 The fact that a Canadian court
would not reach a similar conclusion or render a damages award in
a similar amount did not, without more, render the foreign
judgment unrecognizable.14 3  Thus, the alleged excessiveness of
the Florida judgment and its likely unacceptable nature to most
Canadians did not support application of the public policy
defense.144
In the decade following Beals, Canadian courts addressing the
public policy defense have reaffirmed its holding that the defense
is limited to challenges directed at foreign laws that violate the
and people across state lines" is as much an imperative internationally as it is
interprovincially," (quoting Morguard Invs. Ltd, 3 S.C.R. at 1098)).
138 Id. para. 28. (stating that international commerce and the movement of people
are "directly relevant to determining the appropriate response of private international law
to particular issues, such as the enforcement of monetary judgments," (quoting Joost
Blom, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Morguard Goes Forth into the World, 28
CAN. Bus. L.J. 373, 375 (1997)).
139 Id. para. 33.
140 Id para. 7 1.
141 Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, para. 71.
142 Id. para. 75.
143 Id. para. 76.
144 Id. para. 77. The fraud defense was inapplicable as the judgment debtors failed
to defend the litigation in Florida and were prevented from challenging the evidence
presented on the question of damages. Id. para. 54-55. There was no violation of natural
justice as the judgment debtors were fully informed of the Florida proceedings, had the
opportunity to defend themselves and had precise knowledge of the amount of their
financial exposure once they received notice of the amount of judgment. Id. para. 69.
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fundamental morality of the Canadian legal system.'4 ' Differences
between foreign laws and Canadian law do not alone provide the
"necessary moral opprobrium" required for application of the
public policy defense.146 Rather, the foreign law upon which the
judgment is based must violate principles running "through the
fabric of society to the extent that it is not consonant with [the
Canadian] system of justice and general moral outlook [such as] to
countenance the conduct, no matter how legal it may have been
where it occurred." 47  Courts may raise public policy issues on
their own initiative in their role as "the guardians of Canadian
constitutional values." 4 8
The public policy defense has been most often cited with
respect to foreign penal judgments and awards of punitive
damages.149  The Canadian Supreme Court has held that penal
orders are imposed pursuant to public law and are outside the
realm of private international law.' Although states are free to
impose punishments, penalties, and taxes, other states are not
obligated to assist in their collection.' This refusal to assist in
collection applies equally to Canadian courts which are not
145 See, e.g., Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft v. Hanne, 2006 ABQB 407, para. 31
(Can.); Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 2008 BCSC 1406, para. 33 (Can.); Bank of
Mongolia v. Taskin 2011 ONSC 6083, para. 50 (Can.); Venezia/Sincies v. King, 2010
ONSC 6453, para. 83 (Can. S.C.); United States v. Shield Dev. Co., [2005] 74 O.R. 3d
595 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
146 Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Haw., Inc. v. Bad Ass Enters., Inc., 2007 ABQB 581
(Can.). The court noted that if every statement of Canadian law were treated as an
expression of public policy for the purpose of preventing recognition of foreign
judgments, "little would be left of the principle of judicial comity." Id. para. 75.
147 Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Haw., Inc., ABQB 581, para. 71 (quoting Boardwalk
Regency Corp. v. Maalouf, [1992] O.J. No. 26, para. 9-10 (Can. Ont. C.A.)).
148 Pro Swing, Inc. v. Elta Golf, Inc., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, para. 59-60 (Can.)
(citing the imposition of capital punishment and the protection of personal information).
149 A penal law is defined as:
[a] law that imposes a punishment for a breach of a duty to the state - as
opposed to a remedial law, which secures compensation for a breach of a duty
owed to a private person .... Liability that is restitutionary in nature and that is
not imposed with a view to punishment of the party responsible is not regarded
as penal in nature.
JEAN-GABRIEL CASTEL & JANET WALKER, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS 8-2 (6th ed.
2005).
150 Pro Swing, Inc., 2 S.C.R. 612, para. 100.
'51 Id.
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permitted to entertain an action for "the enforcement of a foreign
penal, revenue, or other public law [or] ... a foreign judgment
ordering the payment of taxes or penalties that gives effect to the
sovereign will of a foreign power."' 52
Penal judgments do not include awards of punitive damages.
Recognition of a foreign punitive damages award may not be
barred merely because such an award or amount would not be
available in Canada.' Even though the award may have been
granted utilizing different criteria and may appear "alarming" in
amount, such differences are irrelevant for the purposes of
recognition.154 However, this result assumes that the procedure
resulting in the award conformed to the requirements of due
process, including fundamental fairness, adequate notice, and an
opportunity to defend a claim.'"' Additionally, at least one court
has expressed concern about foreign damages awards, punitive or
otherwise, that do not distinguish between the claims upon which
they are based and the recipients.'5 6
As these cases demonstrate, one of the legacies of Beals is
liberal recognition of foreign judgments."' However, in the ten
years since Beals, Canadian recognition actions have exclusively
involved U.S. court judgments,' judgments of courts with a
152 Id.
153 See, e.g., Bank of Mongolia v. Taskin, 2011 ONSC 6083, para. 51 (Can.).
154 See, e.g., Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 2008 BCSC 1406, para. 33, 41 (Can.);
Suncom, Inc. v. Andrew Stone Casino Promotions, Inc., 2007 BCSC 1904, para. 30
(Can.).
155 See, e.g., Dexia Credit Local, 2008 BCSC 1406, para. 41; Suncom, Inc., 2007
BCSC 1904, para. 31.
156 S. Pac. Imp., Inc. v. Ho, 2009 BCCA 163, para. 53 (Can.).
157 See, e.g., Richard Frimpong Oppong, Enforcing Foreign Non-Money
Judgments: An Examination of Some Recent Developments in Canada and Beyond, 39
U. BRIT COLUM. L. REv. 257, 257 (2006) (describing the holding in Beals as a "quiet
revolution"); Allison M. Sears, Beals v. Saldanha: The International Implications of
Morguard Made Clear, 68 SASK. L. REv. 223, 238 (2005) (describing the Canadian
approach to recognition of foreign judgments as "generous"); Ronald A. Brand, Punitive
Damages Revisited: Taking the Rationale for Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments
Too Far, 24 J.L. & CoM. 181, 195 (2005) (describing the holding in Beals as
"appropriate in a modem business climate").
158 See, e.g., Davidson v. Lesenko, 2008 ABQB 349 (Can.) (California judgment);
Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Haw., Inc. v. Bad Ass Enters., Inc., 2007 ABQB 581 (Can.) (Utah
judgment); Minn. Valley Alfalfa Producers Coop. v. Baloun, 2005 ABQB 114 (Can.)
(Minnesota judgment); Nunes v. Collins, 2012 BCSC 622 (Can.) (Nevada judgment);
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shared legal heritage, 59 or judgments of courts from a national
legal system with a perceived level of reliability.'60 Canadian
courts have not reviewed judgments originating in the developing
world of the magnitude presented by Yaiguaje v. Chevron
Corporation.'6 ' The approach taken by the courts called upon to
address this recognition request will have a lasting impact upon
the reputation and credibility of the Canadian judiciary and will
require greater elaboration of the public policy defense.162
V. The Public Policy Defense and Yaiguaje v. Chevron
Corporation
A. Background
The public policy defense may prove to be an effective means
through which Chevron may challenge recognition of the
Judgment in Canadian appellate courts. The amount of the
Judgment, the fact that a significant portion of it may be
characterized as penal or punitive, and its lack of consistency with
Litecubes, L.L.C. v. N. Light Prods., Inc., 2009 BCSC 181 (Can.) (Missouri judgment);
Marx v. Balak, 2008 BCSC 195 (Can.) (Utah judgment); Garner Estate v. Gamer, [2007]
68 B.C.L.R. 4th 150 (Can S.C.) (Oregon judgment); Ultracuts Franchises, Inc. v. Wal-
Mart Can. Corp., 2005 MBQB 294 (Can.) (Arkansas judgment); Marcus Food Co. v.
DiPanfilo, 2012 ONSC 1505 (Can. S.C.) (Kansas judgment); Disney Enters., Inc. v.
Click Enters., Inc., [2006] 267 D.L.R. 4th 291 (Can. Ont. S.C.) (New York judgment).
159 See, e.g., Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Berezowski, 2006 ABQB 625 (Can.) (English
judgment).
160 See, e.g., Grundstuecksverwaltungsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Hanne, 2012
ABQB 624 (Can.) (German judgment); Venezia/Sincies v. King, 2010 ONSC 6453,
para. 83 (Can.) (Italian judgment); Oakwell Eng'g, Ltd. v. Enernorth Indus., Inc., [2005]
76 O.R. 3d 528 (Can. Ont. S.C.) (Singaporean judgment); Cook Nook Hazelton Lanes,
Ltd. v. Trudeau Corp., [2003] O.J. No. 3354 (Can. S.C.) (French judgment).
161 See Sears, supra note 157, at 242-43 ("It will be interesting to see how courts
will [decide cases] when they are faced with judgments emanating from foreign states
whose judicial processes and protections are less congruent with Canada's.").
162 See, e.g., Tanya J. Monestier, Foreign Judgments at Common Law: Rethinking
the Enforcement Rules, 28 DALHOUSIE L.J. 163, 180 (2005) ("[F]oreign means foreign-
the [Beals] test, in theory, would apply equally and indiscriminately to judgments from
the U.S., Ghana, Uzbekistan, Romania and Burkina Faso."); Antonin I. Pribetic,
"Strangers in a Strange Land"-Transnational Litigation, Foreign Judgment
Recognition, and Enforcement in Ontario, 13 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 347, 388 (2004)
(concluding the lack of clarity in the Canadian recognition rules "begs the question
whether. . . 'hard cases' will continue to put pressure on the traditional doctrine that an
enforceable foreign judgment is conclusive on the merits").
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fundamental morality present several opportunities for Canadian
courts to deny recognition. The controversy regarding who in fact
is entitled to proceeds derived from the Judgment presents another
ground for non-recognition. The disregard of separateness
between Texaco, Chevron and their subsidiaries may violate
fundamental principles of Canadian corporate law or, at the least,
require an interpretation of such principles for which there is no
precedent. Recognition may also be interpreted as countenancing
Plaintiffs' misconduct as alleged by Chevron and affirmed, in part,
by the opinions of U.S. federal courts.
Applying the public policy defense, the most significant
challenge to recognition in Canada is undoubtedly the amount and
nature of the Judgment itself. The amount of the Judgment is
grossly excessive and far larger than any previously-recognized
judgment in Canadian history.'6 3 However, courts confronting
large damages awards in recognition proceedings have held that
the public policy defense was not intended to bar enforcement of a
foreign judgment "for the sole reason that the claim in the foreign
jurisdiction would not yield comparable damages in Canada."'
This reasoning has been interpreted to permit recognition of a
large foreign damages award even though the level of such an
award has never been reached in Canada and the considerations
utilized in its calculation are substantially different.' 5
This reasoning is founded upon two fundamental
considerations. Initially, courts have been reluctant to impose
Canadian standards on the quantum of damages simply due to the
presence of the judgment debtor in the province.'66 This
reluctance is especially acute in cases where the judgment debtor
163 Jennifer McPhee, Huge American Judgment Enforced and Recognized in
Canadian Law, LAW TIMES (May 7, 2007), http://zvulony.ca/wp-content/uploads/largest-
judgment.pdf.
164 Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, para. 76 (Can.). See also Bank of
Mongolia v. Taskin, 2011 ONSC 6083, para. 51 (Can.) ("[T]he public policy defense is
not meant to bar enforcement of a judgment on the basis that the claim in the foreign
jurisdiction would not yield comparable damages").
165 See Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 2008 BCSC 1406, para. 33 (Can.) (permitting
recognition of a U.S. punitive damages award despite the fact that such awards have
"never reached the levels that they have in the United States, and even though the
considerations in calculating a punitive damage award are substantially different between
the United States and Canada").
166 Id. para. 39 (citing Clarke v. Lo Bianco, [1991] 59 B.C.L.R. 2d 334 (B.C.S.C.).
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relocated to Canada after the cause of action in the foreign
jurisdiction arose. 167 A second consideration is that the large
judgments presented for recognition to date have been rendered
after compliance with due process, including notice, a hearing, the
presentation of evidence, and a neutral decision-maker.168
Utilizing this reasoning, provincial courts have recognized large
damages awards without considerable difficulty.169 The following
section of the article examines these and other grounds for denying
recognition of the Judgment in Canada.
B. The Penal Nature of the Judgment
Like most other national courts, Canadian courts will not
enforce judgments based on foreign penal or other public laws.'70
The Supreme Court of Canada has defined a penal law as one that
"imposes a punishment for a breach of duty to the state as opposed
to a remedial law, which secures compensation for a breach of
duty owed to a private person.""' This breach of duty moves
penal awards outside of the realm of private international law and
into public international law, a realm in which Canada is not
obliged to offer assistance in collection.172 A judgment that is
"restitutionary in nature and that is not imposed with a view to
punishment of the party responsible is not regarded as penal in
nature" and is subject to recognition.1 73
Two portions of the Judgment may be subject to non-
167 Id.
168 Id 1 39,41.
169 See, e.g., Grundstuecksverwaltungsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Hanne, 2012
ABQB 624 (Can.) (recognizing a German judgment in the amount of one million euros);
Old N. State Brewing Co. v. Newlands Servs., Inc., (1998) [1999] 58 B.C.L.R. 3d 144
(Can. B.C. C.A.) (recognizing a judgment entered by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina consisting of $396,158 in compensatory damages
and $792,316 in punitive damages pursuant to North Carolina's Unfair and Deceptive
Trade Act); Bank of Mongolia, 2011 ONSC 6083 (Can.) (recognizing two judgments
entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in the
total amount of $67.6 million).
170 Pro Swing, Inc. v. Elta Golf, Inc., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, para. 34 (Can.). See also
KOEHNEN & KLEIN, supra note 125, at 25-30 (explaining the reasons for the refusal of
Canadian courts to recognize foreign penal judgments).
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recognition because of their penal nature. First, the award of
$8.64 billion in punitive damages is penal as it represents 60% of
Chevron's net earnings, a grossly excessive amount that is neither
reflective of Chevron's level of involvement in Ecuador nor
reflective of its complicity in environmental contamination
occurring there.174 In addition, the Provincial Court held that this
award would be vacated if Chevron issued a public apology within
fifteen days of entry of the Judgment."' Thus, the penal nature of
this award is also clear to the extent that payment was not linked
to, or intended to provide, compensation to Plaintiffs, but rather
could be excused only through a public apology to the entire
Ecuadorian citizenry. Awards that are truly "restitutionary" in
nature are payable regardless of apologies to either the injured
parties or the general public.17 6 The willingness of the Provincial
Court to excuse payment of this portion of the Judgment in
exchange for Chevron's public apology makes that portion of the
Judgment resemble punishment for a breach of a duty to the state
rather than compensation for a breach of duty to Plaintiffs.
Furthermore, the effect of this apology would have been to waive
Chevron's right to appeal the Judgment, at least on the basis of
liability."' Consequently, the punitive damages portion of the
Judgment is clearly penal to the extent that Chevron was to be
"punished" for exercising its right to appeal.' The nature of this
portion of the Judgment was further confirmed by the Provincial
Court on appeal when it held that the punitive damages award was
not compensatory or intended to punish Chevron for
environmental contamination, but rather to "discourage
[Chevron's] type of procedural conduct ... thus setting an
example of what should not occur in a legal action."l7 9
174 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
175 Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 002-2003, at 185-86 (Sucumbios
Provincial Ct. of Justice of Nueva Loja, Feb. 14, 2011) (Ecuador).
176 See Cassel, supra note 18.
177 See id.
178 See id at 16 (concluding that this portion of the Judgment violates due process
and "forces Chevron either to waive its right to appeal, or to pay a multi-billion dollar
penalty as the price for exercising that right"). Cassel concludes that "[n]o other court in
the world has ever awarded such a 'conditional punitive' damages award, and none
should." Id.
179 Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 2011-0106, at 15 (Sucumbios Provincial
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Those portions of the Judgment for which the Provincial Court
assessed damages outside the scope of environmental degradation
caused by the Consortium's operations are also penal. These
damages, totaling $2.3 billion, included awards for hydrocarbon
exposure, cancer, and forced displacement.'s These damages are
not compensatory in nature, as the Provincial Court completely
failed to assess the purported injury suffered by each individual
plaintiff, determine whether these injuries were the direct result of
the Consortium's activities, and award a specific amount of
damages to individual plaintiffs.'"' However, offending portions
of a judgment rendered unrecognizable by the public policy
defense may be severed. 8 2  Thus, the characterization of any
portion of the Judgment as penal does not prevent recognition of
the remaining portions. Nevertheless, such a characterization
would reduce the total amount of the Judgment subject to
recognition by at least $8.64 billion, perhaps even as much as $11
billion.'
C. The Punitive Damages Portion of the Judgment
A Canadian court called upon to recognize the Judgment must
concern itself with the punitive portion of the damages award. An
initial question is whether a Canadian court can recognize an
award that is not permitted by the local law under which it was
originally entered. Punitive damages awards are unavailable
under Ecuadorian law. The Ecuadorian Civil Code limits damages
to compensatory awards, consequential damages, and lost
Ct. of Justice of Nueva Loja, App. Div., Jan. 3, 2012) (Ecuador).
180 Aguinda No. 002-2003, at 170-71, 183-84 (Sucumbios Provincial Ct. of Justice
of Nueva Loja, Feb. 14, 2011) (Ecuador).
181 This argument could be extended to any individual award within the Judgment
for which the Provincial Court failed to assess the individual injuries, causation as a
result of the Consortium's activities, and a specific amount of damages sufficient to
compensate each individual plaintiff.
182 Pro Swing, Inc. v. Elta Golf, Inc., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, para. 121.
183 The difference between Cabrera's initial assessment of $16.3 billion, Chevron
Corp. Annual Report (2008) supra note 48, and his revised assessment of $27.3 billion,
which included a penalty for unjust enrichment, FRENTE DE DEFENSA DE LA AMAZON,
supra note 50, is approximately $11 billion. The Ecuadorian courts assessed Chevron
$8.64 billion in punitive damages. Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 2011-0106
(Sucumbios Provincial Ct. of Justice of Nueva Loja, App. Div., Jan. 3, 2012) (Ecuador).
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profits.' Plaintiffs were apparently aware of this fact but pursued
punitive damages nonetheless.' The absence of legal authority
for this award is further evident in the haste with which the
Provincial Court was willing to excuse its payment upon receipt of
an apology.186 It is fair to conclude that the punitive portion of the
Judgment was merely "a convenient innovation, designed simply
to double the damages award against a foreign company with deep
pockets."' 87
Canadian courts should not ratify results that are unavailable
or unclear under local law. This is especially true in this case
given the enormity of the award, its potentially devastating effect
upon the judgment debtor, and Plaintiffs' arguably bad faith in
seeking such an award. These factors, when combined with the
absence of due process and a flawed judicial system, also militate
against accession to the Judgment. Rather, the punitive portion of
the Judgment should be examined utilizing standards available to
domestic courts.'88
Recognition of the punitive portion of the Judgment faces
significant obstacles under Canadian standards. As in the United
States, punitive damages have been a topic of considerable
controversy.' A substantial portion of this controversy has been
devoted to the conduct that should be subject to such awards,
procedural considerations, and the absence of monetary limits to
punitive damages.'90 Canadian courts and scholars have debated
184 CODIGO CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 1572 (Ecuador) (providing that "[d]amages include
consequential damages and lost profit").
185 E-mail from Steven Donziger to Josh Lipton (Apr. 22, 2007) (on file with
author) (stating "[p]unitive: no basis in Ecuadorian law, but we could push it and seek it
anyway").
186 See supra notes 64, 66 and accompanying text.
187 Cassel, supra note 18, at 16.
188 The reluctance to impose Canadian standards on the quantum of damages
simply due to the presence of the judgment debtor or its assets in Canada is inapplicable
in this case due to the factors noted in the discussion. See also supra notes 165-169 and
accompanying text.
189 See STEPHEN M. WADDAMS, THE LAW OF DAMAGES IT 11.20-11.100 (1997).
190 Id. These concerns have focused on the vagueness of the type of conduct that
should be subject to such awards, the possible influences of passion and bias, the lack of
protections afforded in such cases as compared to criminal cases despite the punitive
purpose of such awards, the absence of adequate procedural safeguards to challenge such
awards on appeal, and the absence of caps on awards. Id. 1 11.210.
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the anomaly of "a civil court . .. impos[ing] what is in effect a fine
for conduct it finds to be worthy of punishment, and then
remit[ting] the fine, not to the State Treasury, but to an individual
plaintiff who will, by definition, be overcompensated." 9 ' As a
result of this debate, requests for punitive damages receive "the
most careful consideration" and discretion in their award is to be
"most cautiously exercised."l 9 2  Punitive damages are to be
awarded "only in exceptional cases and with restraint."' 9 3 Such
awards are proper only if there is a demonstrated need for
"denunciation, deterrence and retribution." 9 4
The most comprehensive explication of the standards to be
utilized in awarding punitive damages was set forth in Whiten v.
Pilot Insurance Company.9 s In addition to re-emphasizing their
purpose and exceptionality, the Supreme Court of Canada
identified four guiding principles with respect to punitive damages
awards. First, the defendant's conduct must be of such a nature as
to merit judicial condenmation. 96  Such conduct is largely
restricted to intentional torts.' 97 Second, an award of punitive
damages must be rationally related to the purposes of such awards
as well as the facts of the specific case.' 98 Any award above and
beyond the lowest possible award that would serve the purposes of
punitive damages is irrational.'99 The third principle is
191 Id.
192 Vorvis v. Ins. Corp. of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, 1104-05 (Can.); see also
Honda Can., Inc. v. Keays, 2008 SCC 39, para. 68 (Can.).
193 Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 2006 SCC 30, para. 62 (Can.); Whiten
v. Pilot Ins. Co., 2002 SCC 18, para. 69 (Can.).
194 Honda Can, Inc., 2008 SCC 39, para. 69; see also Fidler, 2006 SCC 30, para.
61; Whiten, 2002 SCC 18, para. 68 (describing denunciation, deterrence, and retribution
as "the means by which the jury or judge expresses its outrage at the egregious
conduct").
195 2002 SCC 18 (Can.).
196 Id. para. 67.
197 Id
198 Id. para. 71.
199 Id. However, it is rational to award punitive damages to "relieve a wrongdoer
of its profit where compensatory damages would amount to nothing more than a license
fee to earn greater profits through outrageous disregard of the legal or equitable rights of
others." Id. para. 72. It is important to note in this regard that the Supreme Court of
Canada rejected the use of caps, fixed ratios between compensatory and punitive
damages, and other "mechanical or formulaic" approaches on the grounds that they
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proportionality.20 0 Proportionality takes into account the entirety
of the award, including compensatory, consequential, and punitive
damages, as well as other punishments related to the defendant's
misconduct, and determines whether the total amount of the award
is rationally related to the objectives of denunciation, deterrence,
and retribution.20 1 Excessive damages awards and related
punishments are deemed disproportionate, irrational, and
impermissibly provide the plaintiff with double recoveries or
windfalls.20 2 Finally, punitive damage awards are subject to
appellate court intervention if they "exceed the outer boundaries of
a rational and measured response to the facts of the case."20 3
Applying the reasoning in Whiten, any Canadian court
considering the punitive portion of the Judgment will first need to
determine whether Chevron's conduct is of such a nature as to
merit judicial condemnation. The standard applicable to this
determination was first described in 1989 in Vorvis v. Insurance
Corporation of British Columbia.20 4 The Vorvis standard permits
an award of punitive damages only if the conduct at issue is of a
"harsh, vindictive, reprehensible and malicious nature,"
"extreme," and "deserving of full condemnation and
punishment."20 5  Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada have elaborated upon this standard by describing it as
requiring a marked departure from ordinary standards of decency
existing only in "exceptional cases that can be described as
malicious, oppressive or high-handed," 20 6  and restricted to
"advertent wrongful acts that are so malicious and outrageous that
they are deserving of punishment on their own."207
The question for resolution is whether Chevron's conduct was
improperly focus on plaintiffs loss rather than defendant's misconduct and do not
sufficiently allow for "the many variables that ought to be taken into account in arriving
at a just award." Whiten, 2002 SCC 18, para. 73 (Can.).
200 Id. at para 74.
201 Id
202 Id. at para. 94.
203 Id. at para. 76.
204 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085 (Can.).
205 Id. at 1108.
206 Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 2006 SCC 30, para. 62 (Can.).
207 Honda Can., Inc. v. Keays, 2008 SCC 39, para. 62 (Can.).
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of a "harsh, vindictive, and malicious nature," "extreme," and
"deserving of full condemnation and punishment." Although
Chevron's litigation tactics in Ecuador may be described as "hard
ball," they were arguably no different than those employed by
Plaintiffs.2 08 Chevron's approach to the litigation was further
justified given that the company's financial well-being and
perhaps very existence were at risk because of the amount of
damages Plaintiffs were seeking. In any event, Chevron's post-
litigation conduct is less relevant than the conduct that preceded
the filing of the litigation and that prompted Plaintiffs to seek
punitive damages.
Chevron's pre-litigation actions fall short of the requisite
degree of maliciousness and vindictiveness to justify an award of
punitive damages. Chevron did not engage in intentional conduct,
or any conduct for that matter, designed to injure the environment
in Ecuador. 20 9 Any responsibility for environmental injury lies
with the Consortium and its participants,2 10 specifically, Texaco
and PetroEcuador, both of which are separate entities from
Chevron. 2 1' However, neither of these entities was named as
defendants in the litigation. 2 12  Furthermore, Texaco performed
environmental remediation and was released from further liability
in September 1998, three years before its merger transaction with
Keepep and Chevron.2 13 Chevron was entitled to rely upon this
release in its decision to acquire Texaco despite the efforts of the
Ecuadorian government and Provincial Court to negate its clear
meaning and intent. Finally, although Chevron's defense of the
litigation to date has been aggressive, the arguments advanced on
its behalf have been in good faith, as evidenced by the opinions of
U.S. courts and the Permanent Court of Arbitration.2 14 This
determination is crucial in distinguishing Chevron's defense from
208 Clifford Krauss, Consultant Recants in Chevron Pollution Case in Ecuador,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2013, at B6.
209 See generally Chevron Notice of Arbitration, supra note 42, 33-34.
210 See id 1 31, 33-34.
211 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
212 See Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 002-2003 at 20-25 (Sucumbios
Provincial Ct. of Justice of Nueva Loja, Feb. 14, 2011); see supra text accompanying
note 74.
213 See supra notes 7, 22-23 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 100-12, 119-23 and accompanying text.
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the actions of the insurer in Whiten, who refused to pay a claim on
a fire insurance policy by advancing a completely unsupported
argument that the fire was the result of the insured's arson and
then forced the dispute to proceed to trial after a two year delay,
thereby impoverishing the insured.2 15 Despite such malicious and
vindictive circumstances, the Supreme Court of Canada deemed a
punitive award of $1 million to be rational and proportionate, a
conclusion which cannot be reached with respect to the amount of
the Judgment.216
The second consideration in any review of a punitive damages
award is whether it is rationally related to the purposes for such
awards as well as the facts of the specific case. The rationality
requirement is intended to prevent punitive damages awards
"assessed at figures seemingly plucked out of the air" that result
from civil proceedings where the usual protections afforded
criminal defendants are unavailable to a civil defendant.2 17 The
determination of rationality focuses on the defendant's alleged
misconduct and not on the plaintiffs claimed loss. 218  The
Supreme Court of Canada has instructed courts to examine seven
factors relating to the defendant's conduct in determining whether
an award of punitive damages is rationally related to the purposes
of such awards. 2 19 These factors are: (1) whether the conduct was
planned or deliberate; (2) the defendant's intent and motive; (3)
the period of time over which the conduct persisted; (4) whether
the defendant concealed its misconduct; (5) the defendant's
awareness of wrongdoing; (6) whether the defendant profited from
the conduct; and (7) whether the interest at stake was "deeply
personal to the plaintiff or a thing that was irreplaceable."2 20
Application of the seven factors leads to the conclusion that
the punitive portion of the Judgment is not rationally related to the
215 Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., 2002 SCC 30, para. 112 (Can.).
216 Id. para. 128.
217 Id. para. 39. The Supreme Court referred to such results as "palm tree justice"
in which plaintiffs are "handed a financial windfall serendipitously just because,
coincidentally with their claim, the court desires to punish the defendant and deter others
from similar outrageous conduct." Id
218 Id para. 73. See also Honda Can., Inc., v. Keays, 2008 SCC 39, para. 69 (Can.)
219 Whiten, 2002 SCC 30, para. 113.
220 Id.
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purposes of such awards. As previously noted,22 1 Chevron is not
responsible for the errors and omissions of either Texaco or the
Consortium occurring anywhere from three to thirty-seven years
before Keepep's merger with Texaco. However, the punitive
portion of the Judgment fails to satisfy the rational relationship
standard, even assuming the Consortium's conduct, and Texaco's
conduct in particular, is attributable to Chevron.
While two of the seven factors are favorable to Plaintiffs, the
remaining five factors are either neutral or favor Chevron.2 22
Although the Consortium's operations consisted of intentional
acts, it is unlikely that the adverse environmental and health
impacts were deliberately planned.223 It is equally unlikely that the
Consortium deliberately targeted Oriente residents in an attempt to
destroy their environment, negatively impact their health, and
prevent them from continuing their livelihoods.2 24 Clearly the
Consortium did not conceal its activities from the Oriente
residents or the Ecuadorian government. The Ecuadorian
government was not only a participant in the Consortium through
PetroEcuador, but also regulated, approved, and oversaw the
Consortium's operations.2 25 Far from concealment, the
Consortium's operations and associated impacts were conducted
with the full knowledge and complicity of the Ecuadorian
government.22 6 Texaco, PetroEcuador, and the government were
221 See Chevron Corp. v. Donzinger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
supra text accompanying notes 35, 211.
222 The two factors favorable to Plaintiffs are the period of time over which the
conduct persisted (specifically, March 1964 through completion of the environmental
remediation by Texaco in September 1998) and the personal and irreplaceable nature of
the interests at stake (specifically, the environment, health, and livelihood of affected
residents of the Oriente to the extent such interests were, in fact, demonstrably and
negatively impacted by the Consortium's operations).
223 See Third Interim Award, supra note 7, 3.8 ("Throughout the term of the
Consortium's concession, the Ecuadorian Government regulated, approved and, in many
instances, mandated the Consortium's activities; and no facilities were constructed, nor
wells drilled, nor oil extracted without the Government's oversight and approval.").
224 See id. ("Specifically, section 46 of the 1973 Concession Agreement imposed
obligations on the Consortium in regard to the preservation of natural resources."); see
also id. T 3.10 ("In 1990 (when Petroamazonas assumed the role of operation), TexPet
and the Respondent agreed to conduct an environmental audit of the Consortium's oil
fields.").
225 See supra note 7, 1 3.8 and accompanying text.
226 Id.
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undoubtedly aware that the Consortium's activities were having an
indeterminate impact on the Oriente and its residents. 2 7 Whether
those impacts are the result of wrongdoing, as required by Whiten,
or the result of normal operations of the hydrocarbon extraction
industry over a thirty-four year period is debatable. Furthermore,
unlike the defendant in Whiten, Texaco acknowledged the
presence of environmental injury, negotiated an agreement with
the government to remediate such injury, and did so at significant
cost and with the government's complete approval. 2 28  This
remediation effort is a strong counterpoint to any arguments
regarding Texaco's intent and motive, concealment of its
activities, and its wrongdoing.
Finally, the profits factor is neutral in this case. Although
Texaco earned approximately $500 million as a result of its
participation in the Consortium, it returned $40 million of these
revenues to Ecuador through expenditures incurred in its
environmental remediation efforts. 2 29 The excessive nature of the
punitive portion of the Judgment, more than seventeen times
Texaco's revenues, further neutralizes the impact of this factor.
Rather than having a rational relationship to alleged misconduct, it
appears Chevron has been subjected to Whiten 's "palm tree
justice" with arbitrary damages amounts "seemingly plucked out
of the air." 23 0
There is one additional factor in this case that was not present
and thus not addressed in Whiten, but which is an important
consideration for any Canadian court faced with a request to
recognize the Judgment. This additional factor is the alleged
misconduct of some of Plaintiffs' representatives during the
proceedings in Ecuador 23 1 and the affirmation of some of these
allegations by numerous independent tribunals.23 2 Canadian courts
should not be precluded from examining the conduct of plaintiffs
seeking recognition of punitive damages awards. Such
examination should occur in cases where there are credible reports
227 See supra note 7, 3.10.
228 See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 17, 22 and accompanying text.
230 Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., 2002 SCC 18, para. 39 (Can.).
231 See supra notes 43, 58, 84-86, 102-10 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 43, 58, 101-106 and accompanying text.
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of specific misconduct made in good faith, such misconduct has
been verified by other independent tribunals, the misconduct has
directly contributed to an award of punitive damages, and the
amount of such an award is significant. Whether Canadian courts
should be required to make a positive factual finding with respect
to each of these criteria or accord them varying weights in a
balancing test is beyond the scope of this article. It suffices to say
that such inquiries should not be precluded in cases with the
frequency and types of misconduct alleged to have occurred in
Ecuador, and that recognition of the Judgment may be interpreted
as approval of this misconduct.
Closely related to the rationality requirement is consideration
of the proportionality of the award, a test that takes into account
all other damages and punishments related to the defendant's
misconduct. This requirement is intended to prevent duplication
in the award of damages.23 3 Punitive damages should only be
awarded "in those circumstances where the combined award of
general and aggravated damages would be insufficient to achieve
the goal of punishment and deterrence," or where the defendant
would otherwise be unpunished.2 34 A punitive damages award
may be lessened or eliminated on appeal to the extent that a
defendant has suffered "other retribution, denunciation or
deterrence, either civil or criminal, for the misconduct in
question."235
There is little doubt in this case that the compensatory portions
of the Judgment are more than sufficient to achieve the goal of
punishment and deterrence. The Judgment is $8.56 billion without
the punitive damages award.23 6  This amount is more than
seventeen times the amount of income derived by Texaco from the
Consortium's operations.2 37 This percentage increases to more
than thirty-four times Texaco's earnings if the punitive damages
233 Honda Can., Inc. v. Keays, 2008 SCC 39, para. 70 (Can.).
234 Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 1208 (Can.). See also
Whiten, 2002 SCC 18, para. 123 ("[P]unitive damages are awarded 'if, but only if all
other penalties have been taken into account and found to be inadequate to accomplish
the objectives of retribution, deterrence, and denunciation.").
235 Whiten, 2002 SCC 18, para. 109, 123.
236 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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award is included. 23 8 This award is also significant in relation to
Chevron's financial standing. The award, as a portion of
Chevron's net income, comprehensive income, cash and cash
equivalents, and total assets is 31.7%, 33.8%, 54.1%, and 4%
respectively. 23 9  These percentages increase to 63.7%, 68%,
108.8%, and 8.2% if the punitive portion of the award is included
in the Judgment.240
This award, with or without the punitive portion, is not only
the largest award in a civil action in Ecuador and the largest
judgment for which recognition has been sought in Canada, but is
also one of the largest entered against a private party in any civil
action in world history.24 1 Under such circumstances, it cannot be
successfully contended that the award is insufficient to accomplish
the goal of punishment and deterrence or that elimination of the
punitive damages portion of the Judgment would allow Chevron to
escape punishment. To the contrary, an order recognizing the
Judgment in its entirety, without elimination or significant
reduction of the punitive damages award, would provide Plaintiffs
with a windfall and duplicate the retribution, denunciation, and
deterrence already provided for in the Judgment. This assumes
that Chevron should even be subject to punishment and retribution
given Plaintiffs' attempts to hold it accountable for the
Consortium's conduct despite Chevron's complete absence from
Ecuador.2 42
D. Determining the Beneficiaries of the Judgment
Another consideration that may prevent recognition is the issue
of determining to whom the Judgment is payable. One court has
expressed concern regarding foreign damages awards that do not
distinguish. between the claims upon which they are based and the
238 Id
239 CHEVRON, CHEVRON ANNUAL REPORT 31-33 (2011). In 2011, Chevron had net
income of $26.9 billion, comprehensive income attributable to its operations of $25.3
billion, cash and cash equivalents totaling $15.8 billion, and total assets of $209.4
billion.
240 Id.
241 See Claimants' Supplemental Memorial on the Merits at 1, Chevron Corp. v.
Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012).
242 See Chevron Notice of Arbitration, supra note 42, 34.
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recipients.24 3 In South Pacific Imports, Inc. v. Ho, the British
Columbia Court of Appeals refused to recognize a California state
court judgment on the basis that it did not specifically identify the
parties to whom it was payable.244 The successful plaintiffs in
South Pacific Imports were an individual and a business, but the
judgment failed to distinguish between their claims and whether
the judgment was payable jointly, severally, or jointly and
severally. 24 5 These failures led the court to conclude that the
judgment violated the "well-established principle that to be
enforceable, orders must be clear and specific enough so that the
defendant will know what is expected from him or her."246
The uncertainty surrounding entitlement to the proceeds of the
Judgment is far greater in this case than the uncertainty in South
Pacific Imports. The Judgment provides that the entire amount of
the proceeds is to be placed in a Frente administered trust to be
administered and expended on the remedial measures identified in
the Provincial Court's opinion.24 7 However, the Judgment
completely fails to distinguish between the claims of the
potentially hundreds of individuals purportedly represented by
Plaintiffs. 248 The Judgment also fails to set forth specific amounts
payable to each actual and potential individual claimant.2 49
Rather, Chevron is instructed to simply hand over billions of
dollars to an organization within Plaintiffs' control to be
distributed in an undetermined manner without any judicial
supervision.2 50 It is also uncertain whether the Provincial Court's
instructions are consistent with the Correa administration's plans
for the Judgment proceeds. It is unclear if the Provincial Court
would resist pressure from the Correa administration regarding
disposition of the proceeds, given the absence of judicial
independence in Ecuador and the government's power to remove
243 See South Pacific Imp., Inc., v. Ho, 2009 BCCA 163 (Can. B.C. C.A.).
244 Id. paras. 53, 56.
245 Id. para. 53.
246 Id. para. 52 (citing Pro Swing, Inc. v. Elta Golf, Inc., 2006 SCC 52, para. 30
(Can.)).
247 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 64-67and accompanying text.
250 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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and punish individual judges who do not conform their actions to
the government's will or reach desired conclusions.
Two additional factors are cause for even greater concern.
Plaintiffs' representatives did not produce a comprehensive set of
fee agreements with their purported clients.25 ' The absence of a
comprehensive list prevents Chevron from knowing not only the
names of every person claiming a portion of the proceeds, but also
the amount of each individual claim and the purported injury
suffered by each individual. Instead, the Provincial Court has
instructed Chevron to pay billions of dollars in damages for
undisclosed injuries to unknown persons in amounts to be
determined at a later date.25 2 This is hardly a "clear and specific"
order such that Chevron knows what is expected of it.
The second factor is the dispute among Plaintiffs as to the
disposition of the proceeds. This dispute is most vividly on
display in the litigation initiated by the Huaorani people in New
York state court. The Huaorani plaintiffs have denied
representation of their interests in the Lago Agrio litigation due to
the absence of a signed retainer agreement.253 The Huaorani
plaintiffs, and potentially others, have claimed Plaintiffs or the
Ecuadorian government plan on improperly controlling the
proceeds derived from recognition and enforcement of the
Judgment.254 The Huaoranis' claims, as well as other claims
which may arise in the future, add further confusion to the identity
of the parties entitled to share in the Judgment and place Chevron
at risk of further litigation should proceeds be improperly
distributed amongst the Plaintiffs in either a voluntary or
involuntary manner.
E. Piercing the Corporate Veil
A final significant public policy challenge worthy of mention
is the Judgment's disregard for separation between Chevron,
Texaco, and its subsidiaries. In an undated memorandum
discussing global enforcement strategies, Plaintiffs concluded that
their interests could be furthered by filing multiple enforcement
251 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
252 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
253 See supra note 114, $ 58.
254 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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actions against Chevron-related entities on a worldwide basis.255
This strategy would be most effective in states with a "flexible
interpretation of the 'piercing the corporate veil' doctrine" as to
permit "reverse veil-piercing" to hold Chevron-related entities
liable for Chevron's actions.25 6 According to Plaintiffs, reverse
veil-piercing would enable them to seize the assets of a Chevron
subsidiary to satisfy the Judgment against Chevron.257 While
acknowledging that reverse veil-piercing is rare, Plaintiffs also
noted that it is guided by the same equitable principles applicable
to traditional veil-piercing, is committed to the discretion of the
court, and is highly fact-specific. 258
Academic literature defines "outsider reverse piercing" as an
attempt by a party with a claim against an individual or
corporation to seek repayment from the assets of a corporation
owned or substantially controlled by the judgment debtor.25 9 The
primary purpose of such an effort is to "increase the ease of
collecting on [the] judgment by skipping the intermediary step of
seizing the defendant's interest in the corporation."2 6 0  The
doctrine originated in the case of Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake
Champlain Transportation Co. in which the judgment creditor
sought collection of an outstanding debt for repair work by
attaching the assets of a subsidiary of the judgment debtor.2 6' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the
judgment creditor's application and noted that reverse piercing, to
the extent it was a viable method to collect judgments, was
appropriate only in "rare" circumstances.26 2 The central issue to
the application of the doctrine was the extent of control and
influence the subsidiary exercised over the parent company with




259 See Michael Richardson, The Helter Skelter Application of the Reverse Piercing
Doctrine, 79 U. CIN. L. REv. 1605, 1605-06 (2011); see also Gregory S. Crespi, The
Reverse Piercing Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards, 16 J. CORP. L. 33 (1990).
260 Richardson, supra note 259, at 1605-06.
261 Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.
1929).
262 Id. at 267.
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regard to the specific action giving rise to the debt.2 63  Reverse
piercing was inapplicable in that case as there was no evidence
that the subsidiary controlled the parent company or participated
in the decision that gave rise to the debt.26 U.S. courts have
remained deeply divided on the appropriateness of reverse
piercing in the eighty-four years since Kingston.265
It is unlikely that the reverse piercing sought in this case will
be successful from a public policy standpoint. Unlike the United
States, Canada has no recognized body of case law sanctioning
263 Id.
264 See id
265 Some courts have embraced the doctrine as a legitimate method of judgment
collection under certain circumstances. These courts have relaxed the restrictions set
forth in Kingston or acknowledged that reverse piercing is akin to traditional applications
of the piercing doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Easton, 647 N.Y.S.2d. 904, 909 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1995) (concluding that "conceptually 'reverse' piercing is not inconsistent with nor
antithetical to the salutary purposes of traditional piercing" and "[t]he direction of the
piercing is immaterial where the general rule [of control and use] has been met"); W.G.
Platts v. Platts, 298 P.2d 1107, 1110-11 (Wash. 1956) (rejecting Kingston and holding
that reverse piercing does not require the subsidiary to be involved in the conduct that
was the subject matter of the litigation against the parent corporation). Other courts,
however, have severely limited the doctrine. See, e.g., Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295,
1299 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting reverse piercing on the basis that it grants priority to
creditors of an individual shareholder at the expense of business creditors who could not
have foreseen the risk and damages the ability of businesses to obtain credit); Cascade
Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1576-77 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that
the corporate form should be preserved, reverse piercing impermissibly bypasses
traditional judgment collection procedures, innocent shareholders would be injured as a
result of reverse piercing, and that there was no demonstrated exigency requiring the
recognition of a new method of judgment collection). A third group of courts have
permitted reverse piercing but under widely-differing circumstances. See, e.g., In re
Schwarzkopf, 626 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (restricting reverse piercing to alter
ego trusts); McCall Stock Farms, Inc. v. United States, 14 F.3d 1562, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (permitting reverse piercing where one party was the alter ego of another party
even in the absence of fraud); Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, 910 F.2d 240, 245
(5th Cir. 1990) (permitting reverse piercing in the event of improper intermingling of
personal and corporate assets); United States v. Boscaljon, No. CIV. 07-4111, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26980, at *12 (D.S.D. Mar. 22, 2010) (permitting reverse piercing only
when "no innocent individual would be harmed thereby"); LFC Mktg. Group, Inc. v.
Loomis, 8 P.3d 841, 847 (Nev. 2000) (permitting reverse piercing where innocent
shareholders of the corporation would not be negatively impacted); Sweeney, Cohn,
Stahl & Vaccaro v. Kane, 6 A.D.3d 72, 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (allowing reverse
piercing when the corporation knew about the outstanding debt when it formed and was
formed in order to avoid satisfaction of any resulting judgment).
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266reverse piercing. Canadian courts have applied the "alter ego"
theory in traditional veil-piercing cases when the company is a
"mere 'agent' or 'puppet' of its controlling shareholder or parent
corporation." 267 The Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged
that cases lifting the veil in such circumstances have followed "no
consistent principle," and that the separate entities principle will
be disregarded when it would yield a result "too flagrantly
opposed to justice, convenience[,] or the interests of the
Revenue." 268
However, difficulty in defining precisely when the corporate
veil may be lifted "does not mean that a court is free to act as it
pleases on some loosely defined 'just and equitable' standard." 2 69
For example, the Ontario Supreme Court has applied a strict
approach requiring "complete control" and utilization of the
subsidiary as "nothing more than a conduit used by the parent to
avoid liability" or accompanying fraud in order to justify disregard
for the separate entities doctrine.27 0 The "complete control"
element requires "complete domination," lack of independent
function, and ownership. 27' A "typical" relationship that consists
of ownership and shared membership on a board of directors that
simultaneously maintains independent management and separate
and distinct businesses does not meet this standard.27 2 The fraud
element requires a determination of whether conduct has occurred
that would "unjustly deprive claimants of their rights."27 3 The
party against whom such a claim has been made must be a
266 Canadian corporate law adheres to the principle of separation of corporations
from their shareholders set forth in the English law. See Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co.,
[1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.); see also Constitution Ins. Co. v. Kosmopoulos, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2,
para. 12; Transamerica Life Ins. Co. of Canada v. Canada Assurance Co., [1996] 28
O.R.3d 423, para. 13 (S.C.).
267 See Kosmopoulos, I S.C.R. para. 12.
268 Id. (quoting LAWRENCE CECIL BARTLETT GOWER, MODERN COMPANY LAW 112
(4th ed. 1979)).
269 Transamerica Life Ins. Co. of Canada, [1996] 28 O.R.3d 423, para. 21 (Can.
S.C.).
270 Id. para. 25.
271 Id. para. 27
272 Id
273 Id. para. 25.
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participant in the alleged fraud.274
The action seeking recognition of the Judgment is not a proper
circumstance for reverse piercing, assuming Canadian courts
would allow such a claim in the absence of a recognized body of
case law and apply the same principles utilized in traditional
piercing cases. There is no evidence that the subsidiaries
controlled Chevron or participated in the activities that gave rise to
the Judgment.2 75 The allegations of whole ownership,
management, support, and reporting in the Statement of Claim
may be sufficient for traditional piercing from the subsidiary to the
parent corporation but do not permit reverse piercing from the
parent corporation to the subsidiary.2 76 The Statement of Claim
does not contain any allegations of fraud by Chevron or Chevron
Canada Limited.2 77
It is equally unlikely that the portion of the Judgment imposing
liability upon Chevron for the Consortium's operations in Ecuador
will be recognized by a Canadian court. The Judgment disregards
the corporate separateness of Texaco and Chevron by placing
liability upon Chevron for the Consortium's operations.27 8 In so
doing, the Provincial Court pierced the corporate veil and declared
that the Chevron and Texaco merger transaction was an illicit
attempt to evade liability for environmental damage caused by the
Consortium.2 79 The Provincial Court also pierced the corporate
veil between Texaco and its Ecuadorian subsidiaries.2 80
The piercing of the corporate veil between Texaco and its
Ecuadorian subsidiaries is contrary to the findings and conclusions
of other independent tribunals. The separate nature of Texaco and
its Ecuadorian subsidiaries was established in 2001, when a U.S.
district court held that there was insufficient evidence to establish
direction and control of Texaco's subsidiaries such as to impose
274 Id
275 See Statement of Claim, supra note 1, 21
276 Id. 11 15-17.
277 The Statement further provides that "[t]he plaintiffs do not allege any
wrongdoing against Chevron Canada." Id. T 21.
278 See supra notes 87-88.
279 See id.
280 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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liability upon the parent corporation in the United States.281 If
Texaco cannot be held liable for the activities of its Ecuadorian
subsidiaries, it is difficult to see how Chevron could be held
responsible given that its liability, if any, is the direct result of its
business relationship with Texaco.2 82 This lack of evidence was
recognized by Plaintiffs as early as July 1995, when they
stipulated that they had "no knowledge, information, or documents
having any tendency to prove" or "lead to the discovery of
information or documents" that might prove "events relating to the
harm alleged by plaintiffs occurring in the United States
[including directions, communications, discussions, assistance, or
guidance] ... and the extent, if any, to which conduct in the
United States caused actionable harm.",283 This admission should
be given its full legal effect to overcome any claim that Texaco or
Chevron is responsible for the Consortium's activities conducted
through Texaco's Ecuadorian subsidiaries.
The piercing of the corporate veil between Chevron and
Texaco is also contrary to the findings and conclusions of other
neutral tribunals. In 2011, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that "[a]s a matter of U.S.
law, the assertion that Chevron succeeded to Texaco's liabilities
by merger is incorrect., 2 84 This conclusion was reaffirmed by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in its Third Interim Order issued in
February 2012.285 The court noted that Chevron's involvement
with Texaco commenced "long after the events said to give rise to
Chevron's liability and occurring at a time when Texaco (not
Chevron) was ... [the] parent company." 286 The court further held
that Chevron and Texaco maintained "distinct legal personalities
and corporate histories."287 The "legal reasons" for the
amalgamation of Chevron with Texaco in the Ecuadorian litigation
281 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also
supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
282 See Statement of Claim, supra note 1, T 3
283 Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
284 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 600 n.40 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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thus remained "unclear to the Tribunal."2 88  The findings and
conclusions of these tribunals provide additional support for the
refusal of any Canadian court to hold Chevron accountable for the
actions of Texaco's subsidiaries, recognize the Judgment, or
enforce it through the seizure of assets of Chevron's completely
unrelated Canadian subsidiaries.
Additionally, the portions of the Judgment permitting such
piercing are essentially equitable in nature.2 89 However, foreign
non-money judgments are not recognizable under current
Canadian law. In Pro Swing, Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., the Supreme
Court of Canada refused to recognize a non-money judgment
issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio and sought to be enforced in the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice. 29 0 The court acknowledged that "modern-day commercial
transactions require prompt reactions and effective remedies."29 1
These "reactions and remedies" led the court to state that "the time
is ripe to revise the traditional common law rule that limits the
recognition and enforcement of foreign orders to final money
judgments." 29 2  However, the court held that changes to the
common law must be made with caution and "accompanied by a
judicial discretion enabling the domestic court to consider relevant
factors so as to ensure that the [non-money judgment] orders do
not disturb the structure and integrity of the Canadian legal
system." 29 3 The court concluded that the matter before it was not
the proper case in which to effectuate a change in the common
law.294 Likewise, the equitable portions of the Judgment are not
the proper case in which to effectuate a change in Canadian
common law for the multitude of reasons previously noted.295
288 Id.
289 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 484 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "equitable relief'
as consisting of a remedy other than money damages).
290 Pro Swing, Inc. v. Elta Golf, Inc., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612 (Can.).
291 Id. para. 1.
292 Id. para. 15. The court further noted that "[t]he case for adapting the common
law rule that prevents the enforcement of foreign non-money judgments is compelling."
Id. para. 1.
293 Id. paras. 1, 15.
294 Id para. 1.
295 See supra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
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Reverse piercing as a remedy is also an equitable doctrine.29 6
Given this nature, it should only be applied sparingly when legal
remedies are "unavailable or inadequate to protect the interests of
creditors who are seeking to pierce the corporate veil." 29 7 Given
Canadian courts' adherence to both corporate separateness and
restrictions upon traditional veil-piercing resembling those in the
United States, it is reasonable to assume that Canadian courts
would view reverse piercing, to the extent that it is recognized at
all, as an equitable remedy.
Domestic equitable considerations may prevent reverse
piercing in this case. Plaintiffs have numerous adequate legal
remedies available to them. Plaintiffs have a substantial money
judgment against one of the largest multinational corporations in
the world. The Judgment debtor maintains substantial assets
across the globe capable of satisfying, at least in part, the
Judgment. 298  These assets may be directly levied upon through
recognition actions wherever they may be found. This includes
the United States, Chevron's domicile, which Plaintiffs have
studiously (and perhaps astutely) avoided to date.2 9 9 The presence
of multiple adequate legal remedies renders it unnecessary to
utilize an equitable remedy in which corporate separateness is
disregarded and assets of independent subsidiaries are seized to
satisfy debts arising from activities in which they were
uninvolved.
Finally, reverse piercing would usurp the rights of creditors of
Chevron Canada Limited.3 00 Reverse piercing would subject
296 See, e.g., Schimmelpenninck v. Bryne, 183 F.3d 347, 358 n.23 (5th Cir. 1999);
Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295, 1300 (10th Cir. 1995); McKinney v. Gannett Co., 817 F.2d
659, 666 (10th Cir. 1987).
297 Richardson, supra note 259, at 1625; see also Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1300;
McKinney, 817 F.2d at 666.
298 Chevron, Chevron Reports Second Quarter Net Income of $5.4 Billion,
CHEVRON (Aug. 2, 2013, 5:30 AM), http://chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/
08022013 chevronreportssecondquartemetincomeof54billion.news.
299 Mark A. Nordenberg, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (Apr. 2012), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
brandenforce.pdf/$file/brandenforce.pdf.
300 Reverse piercing may also negatively impact the rights of uninvolved and
innocent shareholders by exposing them to unascertainable risks and greater degrees of
harm from the actions of other stakeholders. See Richardson, supra note 259, at 1625-
26; see also C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. P'ship, 580 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 2003)
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creditors of these entities to risks that they could not have
reasonably anticipated, given the absence of a clearly expressed
doctrine permitting such piercing in Canadian law. It is unlikely
that these creditors expected assets loaned to these entities to be
liquidated to satisfy a debt of their separate parent corporation
arising from activities in another jurisdiction completely unrelated
to their Canadian operations.3 0 ' Reverse piercing would also
impermissibly give Plaintiffs priority over consensual creditors by
granting them preferential access to corporate assets.30 2 The
possibility of such priority could not possibly have been known to
or investigated by these creditors prior to the closing of the
underlying transactions.3 03 Reverse piercing may also raise due
process concerns for secured creditors with respect to the
disposition of their collateral. 304  The presence of this class of
innocent victims differentiates reverse piercing from traditional
piercing cases.305  It also militates against a Canadian court
exercising its equitable powers and permitting reverse piercing in
this case.
VI. Conclusion
The stakes for the Canadian judicial system arising from this
recognition proceeding are high. Canadian courts will be required
to reconcile Canada's liberal recognition approach with the many
obstacles and deficiencies within the Judgment. On a positive
note, Plaintiffs' recognition action presents an opportunity to
revise the defenses to recognition for judgments emanating from
(concluding that reverse piercing is not appropriate unless the moving party can prove by
clear and convincing evidence that innocent shareholders will not be negatively
impacted).
301 See Richardson, supra note 259, at 1627 ("[A] loaning institution would not
expect assets loaned to a corporation alone to be sold off to pay the debts of its owner").
302 Id.
303 Id. at 1628.
304 Id.; see also In re Hamilton, 186 B.R. 991, 1000 (D. Col. 1995) (discussing due
process concerns arising from the attachment of collateralized assets through reverse
piercing and the lack of notice to secured creditors of the potential dissolution of the
corporation and liquidation of its assets).
305 See Richardson, supra note 259, at 1625 (noting that the "deceptive fiction
beneath reverse piercing is that it is identical to the traditional situation and can thus be
handled in the same manner, a fallacy fueled by a myopic focus on the principal
parties").
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the developing world.30 6 One such revision would require courts
to recognize foreign judgments "only to the extent that similar or
comparable damages would have been awarded by the enforcing
court."3 07 The Canadian judiciary will be called upon to rethink its
liberal approach to recognition in the cold, hard light of a tainted
judgment emanating from a flawed judicial system in a remote
corner of the developing world.
306 See JEAN GABRIEL CASTEL & JANET WALKER, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS,
14-27 (5th ed. 2002) (commenting that revision of the defenses to recognition is
necessary "so as to protect persons ... who have been sued in foreign courts from
particular kinds of unfairness that can arise in cross-border litigation, and so as to
prevent abuse from occurring as a result of liberal rules for the enforcement of
judgments").
307 Monestier, supra note 162, at 194; see also Janet Walker, Beals v. Saldanha:
Striking the Comity Balance Anew, 5 CAN. INT'L L. 28, 28 (2002).
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